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Abstract
Variation in scam classification is regularly identified as a primary cause of discrepancy in victim
report data resulting in unsuccessful scam identification and insufficient rates of interception by law
enforcement, which results in the low prosecution rate of scammers. The result of such
discrepancies lead to complex concerns, such as the under reporting of scam incidence, and reduced
rates of successful follow up by investigative and enforcement agencies consequential to difficulties
in making correct referrals. Without a shared and common lexicon of scam labels and descriptions,
communication between investigative agencies and cross-border cooperation is obstructed. With no
compatible comprehension of the scam lexicon, timely progression in scam-case management
leading to the identification, tracking and interception of scammer communications cannot be
realised. Ambiguities leading to interpretational impedances are aiding scammers by enabling their
scams in cross-jurisdictional and multi-national platforms. If the wide variety of known scam types
could be condensed to recognisable and traceable instances, the business models that scammers
use could be identified and future scamming events predicted, monitored, and interrupted.
Following a mixed methodology, this research aims to address some of these concerns. This is
achieved by clustering scam descriptions and partitioning them into scam types, called scam genres.
The result of which reveals homogeneous groups of scam cases and allows for the assessment of the
effectiveness of using static features in identifying scam types. Second to this, identification of the
most suitable model for reducing scam cases into the fewest number of clusters with the least
number of scam cases within in each cluster at an accuracy level of at least 95% is achieved.
Through the use of hierarchical clustering, this research grouped publically available scams into
homogeneous clusters of scam genres. Two-hundred and seventy-seven scams from 38 separate
categories of scam classification were condensed into as few as 7-clusters of scam genre. Following a
mixed methodological, grounded theoretical approach and using discriminant function analysis, 82
static features were derived from the 277 scam descriptions analysed. Of the 82 static features
derived, it was concluded that only 68 significantly predicted scam type and explained 95% of the
total variation found in scam case assignment. The most significant static features determined to be
crucial to any scamming campaign and useful in identifying the type of scam genre a scam case
belongs to were; what the scam offered, the role of the victim, the goal of the scammer and the
method of scam introduction.
The results of this research provide empirical evidence of the inconsistent use of definitions across
jurisdictions in scam descriptions, and will contribute to the development of a uniform lexicon of
scamming terminology as well as become foundational to further research on the impact of scams
for law enforcement, the public and private sector, the community and the individual.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Frauds and Scams
Fraud is commonly described as the unlawful attainment of something of value realised through
deceptive means (Hays and Prenzler, 2002, Lea et al., 2009, Stabek et al., 2009, and Wahlert, 1998).
A scam is a tool adopted by fraudsters and used for agenda optimisation, thus a scammer is also a
fraudster, and a scam therefore belongs to the family of fraud existing as a subset of fraud. In this
section, a formal definition of fraud is introduced.
According to Hays and Prenzler (2002), a hierarchy of fraud is known, beginning with four categories
of fraud which can be defined by; a) the intended target of the scam, b) the role of the perpetrator,
and c) the method of scam perpetration (see Figure 1). To formally define these fraud categories let
A, B, C and D represent each of the four fraud sets where x is the perpetrator, y represents the
intended target of the scam and z is the method of scam perpetration:
A: x = a principle or senior official, y = an organisation, z = undefined
B: x = a client or employee, y = an organisation, z = undefined
C: x = undefined, y = a number of individuals, z = print or electronic media
D: x = an individual, y = an individual, z = face to face
Figure 1: Fraud Hierarchy
For fraud types A and B, only the role of the perpetrator and the target is known. For these two
fraud clusters the target of the scam is faceless and the fraud is committed by someone with
privileged access or knowledge of the target system or organisation. These two fraud types can be
reconciled with the type of action that may be attributed to a person who may be a disgruntled
employee or a group of individuals with a common agenda which may manifest as industrial
espionage. In fraud cluster C, the role of the perpetrator is unknown, the target is a wide audience,
and the method of perpetration is through the use of various types of media and technological
communication systems, such as the Internet. For the final fraud cluster D, three variables are
known: the perpetrator is an individual, the target is another individual, and the method of fraud
perpetration is through face to face interaction. This type of fraud describes a situation where the
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perpetrator is known to the victim, the crime having evolved over the course of ongoing
communication and developed relationships.
A scam is successful if it reaches its intended victim and, elicits the desired response from the
receiver. Some receivers are aware of the signs of a scam and disregard the communication, while
others respond to the psychological tactics used by the scammer (Lea et al, 2009). For every victim
response there are hundreds and possibly thousands of non-responses and for this reason, one of
the primary business processes (Lea et al., 2009) involved in a successful scam campaign is
marketing, which involves the mass distribution of the scam to as many individuals as possible. For
this reason, Internet distributed scams naturally lay within fraud cluster C; where the perpetrator is
unknown, the target of the scam is a group of individuals, and the method of perpetration is through
print or electronic media. While a hierarchy of fraud is demonstrated, commonalities among scams
appear regularly and this subsequently makes it difficult to correctly and accurately identify scam
perpetrations as the type of incident that they are (Hays and Prenzler, 2002, and Stabek et al., 2009).
A key point needs to be emphasised here about the nature of organised crime – these organisations
often model themselves along the lines of traditional businesses, thus, it is usual for there to be a
“Marketing Department” as well as other business units that fulfil core business functions (such as
recruitment and financial management). In this sense, fraudsters organise their operations by
designing and implementing business processes analogous to legitimate enterprises (Choo et al.,
2009).
The focus of this research is on scams, rather than the broader body of fraud. Due to the hierarchical
nature of the fraud ontology, at times the research crosses over from the cluster of fraud defined as
fraud type C to the other fraud types and categories. The original focus for this research was
technology based scams which encompassed Internet-assisted scams, however, through rigorous
research and investigation it has been recognised that alternatively disseminated scams such as
those described by fraud cluster D, technology may be used at some point throughout the life-cycle
of the scam. Therefore, one of the main assumptions for this body of research is that all scams,
regardless of their dissemination mechanics, incorporate the use of technology to facilitate
perpetration.
The widely complex nature of scams, the intended targets, the methods of dissemination, the
mechanics of scam success and the diverse nature of clientele falling victim to these fraudulent acts
creates a challenge for industry and law enforcement alike. Mass communicability, cross border
liaisons and speed of connectedness enables scammers to optimise their scams (Choo et al., 2008,
and Wahlert, 1998). Due to the abundance of information available to individuals and instantaneous
communication realised by the Wide World Web, scamming incidents have found their way into the
global headlines (Drummond, 2010, United States Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of
Investigation 2010). Since a scammer can operate many scams from one location, on multiple
victims, in several countries, from numerous jurisdictions in unison, communication and cooperation
between enforcement and investigative agencies across national and international borders is
necessary for investigating and combating these crimes (Choo et al., 2008, Stabek et al., 2009, and
Wahlert, 1998).
To facilitate police investigations and propel cross border liaisons into a transnational state of
communicability and cooperation, standardisation of scam language consisting of scam labels,
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descriptions and scam definitions is necessary (Choo et al., 2008, Stabek et al., 2009, and Wahlert,
1998). Such a catalogue must achieve two outcomes: it must identify the actors and processes
involved in “running the business” of scamming, as well as map standardised descriptors to those
currently used in different jurisdictions. By adopting a common language of scams, inter-agency and
cross-agency networking would be strengthened, leading towards cooperative cross-jurisdictional
efforts in identifying, tracking, intercepting and prosecuting scammers.
Part of the problem faced by researchers of scam events is that there are numerous variations of the
same scam all of which share interchangeable labels. This makes it very difficult for investigators,
victims, and families of victims to confidently identify what they are, or have become involved in.
Below are some examples of common scams received by email which illustrate this variation, and
underline the need for a consistent approach to catalogue and describe the underlying processes
involved in running a scam-based business.
The first example seen in Figure 2 is a scare spam campaign which aims to panic the receiver into
forwarding the communication onto everyone in their address book. This type of scam is commonly
called a ‘chain mail’ scam and it requires the receiver to act impulsively by forwarding the scam on
without fully considering the possibility that it is fraudulent. This scam uses the names and titles of
reputable organisations to lend it some authenticity. The purpose of this type of scam is to find its
way into as many email in-boxes as possible. It could be an information gathering campaign or it
could contain malicious content such as a virus or spyware which would be downloaded onto the
receiver’s machine without their knowledge.
"HUGE VIRUS COMING ! PLEASE READ & FORWARD !
Hi All,
I checked with Norton Anti-Virus, and they are gearing up for this virus!
I checked Snopes, and it is for real. Get this E-mail message sent around to
all your contacts ASAP.
PLEASE FORWARD THIS WARNING AMONG YOUR FRIENDS, FAMILY AND CONTACTS!
You should be alert during the next few days. Do not open any message with
an attachment entitled 'POSTCARD FROM HALLMARK,'regardless of who sent it to
you. It is a virus which opens A POSTCARD IMAGE, which 'burns' the whole
hard disc C drive of your computer.
This virus will be received from someone who has your e-mail address on
his/her contact list. That is the reason why you need to send this e-mail to
all your contacts. It is better to receive this message 25 times than to
receive the virus and open it!
If you receive a mail called' POSTCARD,' even if it is sent to you by a
friend, do not open it! Shut down your computer immediately. This is the
worst virus announced by CNN.
It has20been classified by Microsoft as the most destructive virus ever.
This virus was discovered by McAfee yesterday, and there is no repair yet
for this kind of virus. This virus simply destroys the Zero Sector of the
Hard Disc, where the vital information is kept.
COPY THIS E-MAIL, AND SEND IT TO YOUR FRIENDS.
REMEMBER: IF YOU SEND IT TO THEM, YOU WILL BENEFIT ALL OF US
Figure 2: Scare Spam1
1 All scam examples were delivered to the authors e-mail in-box and are copied verbatim from the original e-
mail received
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The PayPal email below in Figure 3 could be called a ‘spam scam’, however, by clicking on the
provided link the receiver is redirected to a falsified or spoofed webpage where he/she are
encouraged to divulge their personal information. By providing their personal details in this manner,
the receiver would become involved in a scam called ‘phishing’; this scam then becomes a spam and
phishing scam. The scammers have taken measures to ensure that the scam looks authentic by using
formal language and the appropriate logos of the target company. Similar to other phishing tactics,
this scam uses fear and urgency to entice the receiver to act before they logically process the
request.
Figure 3: Spam Scam
The following example in Figure 4 is a 419 Spam Scam, this example reads like it is an addition to a
long line of communications and since it was unsolicited, is a spam scam. This email is initially a
‘spam scam’ since it was unsolicited. It also carries signs of a scam known as ‘Nigerian Letter’ or ‘419’
with the seduction of a large sum of money and the use of official sounding people and places to add
credibility to the communication. The receiver would be tricked into thinking that they had
accidentally intercepted a communication and that they might be able to assist in the proposed
transaction, for the identified fee. If the receiver were to contact the named associate and provide
their bank account information, a case of identity theft would be probable leading to identity fraud
and the subsequent draining of the victim’s bank accounts.
Figure 4: Nigerian 419 Spam Scam
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Below in Figure 5 is another phishing style scam, which could also be a syntactically driven spam
campaign. It requires the recipient to click on the supplied link, at which time they would be
redirected to a falsified or spoofed Webpage where they would be encouraged so supply their
personal details, or, the link might contain malicious code which would download malware to the
user’s machine. A common theme emerges throughout all phishing–style tactics and that is
authenticity. This example contains the Australian Coat of Arms and logo for the Australian Taxation
Office (ATO). The timing of receipt for this scam was also pertinent to the success of the scam. This
was distributed within 30 days from the end of the Australian financial year, when those who had
completed their tax returns would be expecting to receive a response from the ATO.
Figure 5: Phishing Spam Scam
This last example seen in Figure 6 exemplifies the opening communication for a possible romance
scam. It uses paraphernalia such as the attachment of a photograph as well as broken English to
humanise the author. It contains a story of dreams and desires and briefly details the hopelessness
that is felt by the woman pictured (supposedly). By responding to such a scam, the recipient would
become involved in a romance scam which could transpire over many months ending with the
payment of fees and bribes to the author’s ‘homeland officials’. For this type of scam campaign, a
spam scam has been received and the victim may be urged to supply not only financial assistance,
but their personal and private details. In which case, identity theft could occur.
Hello!
It is my first letter on English. Sorry, if I made some mistake in words. But I write you from my hand and don't use pre-
written letters.
I am very glad, that you have become interested in me. And I shall try, that you were not disappointed with me and have
learned as much as possible about me.
But I would like to learn you better too. I will ask you, write to me more about you in details.
My name Ekaterina. I live in Ukraine, in city Odessa. I am 28 years old.
If you think, that I am not serious don't make mistake, and know me much more. I gave promise, that I will never married
on Russia boy.
All of them lie and don't hold his word. Some man drink alcohol very much. May be I will tell you more about my past
relation later.
But i don't like think about it, it was no good.
My family are not large. We live with my mother. My mother have good work as bookkeeper. We can pay for all life
expenses.
And I will not ask you help me with money. I know many stories about it. If you will write to me more, you will understand,
that I am not such girl!
I want write to you long letter with much ideas from me, but I think, It will not good for the first letter. I am simple Ukraine
girl, who want to live abroad.
I want have husband and right family. I will try for this very much. I have very serious intention.
My girlfriend find her husband on internet in last year. She move to Australia and they have happy family.
She lives in Sydney and they will have child soon. She write to me letter every week.
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I was glad for it very much. We want to meet some time soon. I have great opportunity move to Australia at the end of this
year.
Don't want write about me and my hobby in first letter.
We can talk on the phone, if you will want it. I don't have own phone, but I can use one from my friend or I can use call
servise on post.
I will glad, if we can chat on MSN. I stay there at the evening and we can talk about all.
Please, send to me your phone number or MSN name, if you want contact with me from other way.
If You really interested in me, you can ask me about all.
I want ask you some question:
Do you have children? What are you doing at work? Did you have past relation, wife?
I hope, you can know some new things about me from this letter.
You can write to me on my e-mail: suhorukovakat@gmail.com
I will wait your letter and hope to receive news from you shortly.
Good luck to us.
Suhorukova Ekaterina.
Figure 6: Romance Spam Scam
Those scam examples presented here are only a small sample of the scams circulating the Web.
Scams are not limited to the Internet however; they can occur in person like with ‘door to door’
scams. A victim could be recruited by a friend as seen with ‘pyramid’ and ‘Ponzi’ style scams, with
many scams still perpetrated in more traditional forms such as over the telephone, and through the
post. In most situations, the victim of a scam has responds to something that they have received and
in other instances, the victim may have inadvertently sought out the scam which is a feature of
‘ticketing’ scams and some Internet auction scams. With the breadth and diversity of scams and
scammer tactics increasing, it is imperative for research to focus on methods of identifying and
combating these crimes (Airioldi and Malin, 2004, ABS, 2007, ACPR and AUSTRAC, 2006, ARC, 2009,
Birzer and Craig-Mooreland, 2008, Choi, 2008, Denman, et al., 2004, Dolan, 2004, Goode et al., 2008,
Hays and Prenzler, 2002, Jie et al., 2004, Lea et al., 2009, OFT, 2006, Stabek et al, 2009, and Wahlert,
1998).
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Having reviewed a set of representative scams, some of the key issues are clear for identifying these
for law enforcement purposes: (a) the “data” of the scam is natural language text, (b) the scam text
describes the current state of some (business) process which require further action from the
recipient; given the variation in text descriptions, trying to categorise these scams as belonging to a
particular “group” could be quite challenging for individual investigators who each have their own
biases, jurisdictions etc that will influence their decisions. What is required is a process that will
allow the scam business processes to be identified from the text descriptions in each scam
communication, and match these to some agreed template for a specific type of scam. Potentially,
new e-mails and websites could then be classified in real-time and users alerted that a message may
be a scam before they are tempted to click on a link that might take them to a phishing website, for
example. In addition, law enforcement could use such a system to aggregate and identify common
scams linking scammers and build a case against them.
A prerequisite to identifying scams is the identification of common business processes for scam
types across jurisdictions. The first goal of the research presented in this thesis is to propose a
technique for developing these templates in an attempt to objectively identify homogeneous groups
of scams that are derived from text-based descriptions of scam types from a number of jurisdictions.
The second goal is to then use the commonalities between the scam descriptions to identify
hierarchical relationships between scam types, based objectively on their business descriptions,
rather than a priori notions of what scams might be related to others. For example, the terms
“identity theft” and “identity fraud” are often used interchangeably, but when you look at the
commonalities between independent descriptions of their business processes, are they the same?
Or, does “identity theft” have more in common with other types of “theft” rather than “fraud”?
These are the kinds of issues that having a technique to objectively identity homogeneity and
hierarchy within business process descriptions could help in resolving.
In this thesis, homogeneity and hierarchy are established by using a vector space model to represent
“static” business elements derived from text descriptions of scams sourced from multiple authorities
and then using hierarchical cluster analysis to group the scams and quantify their relatedness. In
addition, approaches for model validation are also introduced. By deriving data from publicly
available scam descriptions, hierarchical clustering will ensure homogeneous partitioning of scams
into similar clusters that can be inferred from scam static features. This forms analogous scam
clusters which can then be used for building the sorts of templates that could be matched from
potential scam materials, such as e-mails and websites. Secondary to the clustering of scam cases by
their descriptions is the standardisation of scam descriptions and identification of significant static
features which can then be used to confidently identify the type of scam a scam is.
Furthermore, reduction of scam events into homogeneous scam clusters will assist investigative and
law enforcement agencies by reducing time, money and resources spent on scam case
investigations. It is also hoped that the results from this research will lead the way towards a
common scam lexicon and enhanced coordination and cooperation between transnational
taskforces.
More generally, the approach could potentially be generalised to other types of business process
modelling, where there are no formal descriptions of processes marked up in a language, such as
BPXML. A series of candidate classes and their relationships, representing static data elements,
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could be inferred, although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to pursue applications of the
approach outside cybercrime. The set of representative scams reviewed here provide evidence of
some of the commonalities within scam-types and the examples discussed within this chapter verify
these commonalities across scam categories. The reduction of scam events into homogeneous scam
clusters will assist investigative and law enforcement agencies as well as help to standardise the
comprehension of scam-types amongst reporting institutions. This in turn will assist in the useful
comparison of scam incidence across jurisdictions which would provide more accurate and precise
results. The following section expands on the methods and approaches used by international and
national agencies reporting on the incidence of scams and frauds.
1.2 Scams and Statistics
This research was originally influenced by the investigation of publicly available annual reports on
scam incidents. Four main contributors originating from four different countries were investigated;
the Internet Crime Complaint Center (United States of America), the Australian Bureau of Statistics
(Australia), the Environics Research Group (Canada) and the Office of Fair Trading (United Kingdom).
From the initial investigation it was recognised that the data collection, analysis and identification of
scam events across reporting agencies was inconsistent. Presented below, is an overview of these
challenges and an outline of the methodologies used by each reporting agency.
1.2.1 Internet Crime Complaint Center
In 2001 the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC), in collaboration with the National White Collar
Crime Center (NWC3) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) joined forces to produce the first
ever annual Internet Fraud Report (IFCC, 2001). The IFCC operates to this day as the Internet Crime
Complaint Center (IC3) and receives complaints in the form of victim self-report data pertaining to
Internet and computer based crimes. In 2001 the IFCC received 49,711 complaints and referred 34%
of these on for further inquiry (IFCC, 2001). Within the following 12 month period, the number of
victim complaints grew to 75,063 with a 64% referral rate (IFCC, 2002) and by 2008 a total of
275,284 complaints were received (IC3, 2008).
Since the launch of the iC3 in 2001, email has remained the most optimal method of distributing
scamming material to potential victims (see Table 1, below). The percentage of received email-based
scamming communications has increased by 6.4% between 2001 and 2008 and this method of
disbursement accounts for almost 50% (48.5) of all reported scamming communications for 2008.
Web page-based scamming distributions were reported in 28.9% of all victim reports which
represents an increase of 12.5% since 2001. In 2005, web page-based proliferation was reported in
16.5% of cases which increased to 36% the following year. This almost doubling of web page-based
incidents may be explained by the change in detail of what is actually reported upon by iC3. It
appears that during the years 2001 to 2005, the iC3 reported the percentages for ‘method’ for only
those cases referred on for further investigation while the following years, 2006 to 2008, the
method for the total number of complaints received appears to be reported. The third reported
most utilised method of scamming distribution was by phone which accounted for 15.6% of all
received complaints in 2008. Up until 2005, the category of ‘printed material’ was ill-defined which is
apparent by the development of new, more precise categories in the following years. These
developments were the identification of ‘newsgroup’, ‘bulletin board’, ‘wire’, and ‘instant
messenger’ which would take the place of the category known as ‘printed material’. Interestingly,
scammer reliance on printed material for the distribution of their schemes seems to have increased
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for the years 2006 to 2008 since the use of printed materials reached an all time low in 2005 with
less than 1% of complaints, while in 2006, 2007, and 2008 this increased to 22.6%, 21.2% and 18.8%
respectively.
The percentage referral rate received by the iC3 has an impact on the reported statistics for total
dollar losses of each year which are presented in Table 2. Based on those complaints which were
referred on for further investigation and the monetary loss associated with these referrals, the total
monetary loss in the years following 2001 increased by $US107.8 million with the average loss
increasing by $US926.60. During 2003, there was a $US71.6 million decrease in total funds lost and
since then, there has been a steady increase in dollars lost. In 2008, a $US264.4 million loss was
recorded with an average loss of $US3,637.70 and a median loss of $US931.00.
Table 1: Complaint Percentage by scamming method
Table 2: IC3 Recorded Dollar Losses to Internet Crime
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Table 3: IC3 Top Ten Recorded Internet Crime Scams
Table 3 above lists the top ten scams for each year in descending order. With the exception of 2008,
auction fraud was consistently the most reported scam followed by the non-delivery of merchandise
scam. The consistency of appearing in the top ten lists for those reported scams suggests that the
identified scams are stable over time. With this historical perspective of scam events within the USA,
it can be concluded that non-delivery, auction fraud, credit/debit card fraud, confidence fraud,
computer fraud, check fraud, Nigerian 419 fraud, identity theft, financial institutions fraud, and
threats, are likely to be problematic in ensuing years.
1.2.2 Australian Bureau of Statistics
From niche focussed reporting institutions such as the iC3 to broadly defined information collection
and analysis agencies such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), the impact of scams are felt
at all levels of society. The ABS released its first ever Personal Fraud Report (PFR) during 2008. The
report details the results of a telephone survey which was conducted as an addition to the Multi-
Purpose Household Survey (MPHS). The ABSPFR (2008) achieved a sample of 14,320 participants
reporting on their experiences and losses associated with the loosely defined concept of personal
fraud. It was reported that financial losses attributable to personal fraud were in excess of $AUS980
million. The concept of ‘personal fraud’ remained undefined and it is assumed that two exclusive
categories of crime lead a victim to the exposure of personal fraud; identity fraud and scams. The
ABSPFR (2008) collected information pertaining to participant experience in receiving and
responding to possible fraudulent and scam-based invitations. The events identified as identity fraud
crimes were credit or bank card fraud and identity theft while those events identified as scams were
lotteries, pyramid scams, phishing, financial advice scams, chain letters, advance fee fraud and all
other scams (ABS, 2008).
Top
10 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 Auction fraud Auction fraud Auctionfraud
Auction
fraud
Auction
fraud
Auction
fraud
Auction
fraud
Non
delivery
2 Non delivery Non delivery Nondelivery
Non
delivery Non delivery Non delivery
Non
delivery
Auction
fraud
3 Nigerian letterfraud
Credit/debit
card fraud
Nigerian
letter fraud
Credit/debit
card fraud
Credit/debit
card fraud Check fraud
Confidence
fraud
Credit/debit
card fraud
4 Credit/debitcard fraud
Investment
fraud
Credit/debit
card fraud Check fraud Check fraud
Credit/debit
card fraud
Credit/debit
card fraud
Confidence
fraud
5 Confidencefraud Business fraud
Confidence
fraud
Investment
fraud
Investment
fraud
Computer
fraud Check fraud
Computer
fraud
6 Investmentfraud
Confidence
fraud
Investment
fraud
Confidence
fraud
Computer
fraud
Confidence
fraud
Computer
fraud Check fraud
7 Business fraud Identity theft Businessfraud
Identity
theft
Confidence
fraud
Financial
institutions
fraud
Identity
theft
Nigerian
letter fraud
8 Identity theft Check fraud Identitytheft
Computer
fraud
Identity
theft
Identity
theft
Financial
institutions
fraud
Identity
theft
9 Check fraud Nigerian letterfraud Check fraud
Nigerian
letter scam
Financial
institutions
fraud
Investment
fraud Threat
Financial
institutions
fraud
10 Communicationsfraud
Communications
fraud
Intellectual
property
fraud
Financial
institutions
fraud
Child
pornography
Child
pornography
Nigerian
letter fraud Threat
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The ABSPFR (ABS, 2008) results suggest that for the year leading up to the survey, 5.8 million
Australians were exposed to a scam with 1.9 million of those earning less that $AUS499 per week
and 208,000 people earning on average $AUS2500.00 per week. For those Australians exposed to a
scam, 329,000 were victimised by a scammer. The ABSPFR (2008) advise that a person could be
exposed to a scam without becoming a victim; however, if a person were exposed to an identity
fraud incident, they immediately became a victim. There were 882,800 victims of personal fraud and
124,000 of those were victims of identity theft (ABSPFR 2008).
Those scams which achieved the greatest amount of public awareness were lotteries (2,437,400),
phishing (2,374,700), and chain letters (2,054,000) while those scams achieving the greatest number
of victims were lotteries (0.5%), pyramid schemes (0.4%), and phishing (0.4%). Respondents to the
survey reported receiving lottery scam invitations most of the time over the Internet via email or by
post (342,000 and 330,000), while pyramid scheme invitations were most often received in person
(419,000). Phishing (and related) scam requests were disseminated most regularly via the Internet
and email (304,000) followed by telephone (157,000). Financial advice scams were reported to have
only occurred by two channels, these were face to face communication (193,000) and email (92,000)
while chain letter scams were only recorded as having been received by email (129,000) and post
(138,000). The method of scam introduction was not recorded for those recipients of advance fee
scams while the methods of distributions for all other non-defined scams were phone (194,000),
email (317,000), post (90,000) and ‘other’ which includes face to face interactions (90,000). The
method of scam distribution is a clear indicator of scam type and thus is a static feature of scam
construction which will be discussed in further detail in subsequent chapters.
1.2.3 Environics Research Group
The 2007 Consumer Mass Marketing Fraud Survey compiled by the Environics Research Group (ERG)
based out of Canada defined Mass Marketing Fraud (MMF) as mass communication network-
assisted fraud (ERG, 2008). There were 12 identified scams categorised as MMF which were; prize,
lottery or sweepstakes fraud, West African or 419 fraud, employment/work from home fraud,
cheque cashing/money transfer job fraud, overpayment for sale of merchandise fraud, advance fee
loan fraud, upfront fee for credit card fraud, bill for unsuitable merchandise fraud, bogus health
product or cure fraud, advance fee vacation fraud, high pressure sales pitch vacation fraud, and
investment fraud (ERG, 2008).
Similar to the ABSPFS (2008), the MMF survey was administered by telephone interview and only
included Canadian consumers, excluding Canadian businesses. It was reported that 15 million
Canadians became victims of scams losing $CAD450 million during 2007 and it was identified that 9
in 10 victims of scams do not report their experience to the authorities. It is reported that while
recipients of scamming communications change their consumer behaviour in over half of the
interviewed cases, this does not reduce the likelihood of being targeted; survey respondents
received on average 16 scam proposals per year which reportedly increased by 31% for those who
had responded to a communication in the past (ERG, 2008). The ERG indicates that scams traverse
all demographic and socio-economic channels, implying that any one person can become a victim of
mass marketed scams.
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1.2.4 Office of Fair Trading
The 2006 the United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading (UKOFT) Research on the Impact of Mass
Marketed Scams (MMS) (OFT, 2006) estimated that the total UK dollar loss to MMS was £3.5 billion
per annum, averaging £70 each year per adult residing in the UK. The report identified 15 categories
of scam type and suggested that the average dollar loss per scam type was £850. Those scams
identified as MMS were; prize draw/sweepstakes scams, foreign lottery scams, work at home and
business opportunity scams, premium rate telephone prize scams, miracle health and slimming cure
scams, African advance fee frauds/foreign money making scams, clairvoyant/psychic mailing scams,
property investor scams, pyramid selling and chain letter scams, bogus holiday club scams, Internet
dialer scams, career opportunity scams, high risk investment scams, internet matrix scams and loan
scams (OFT, 2006).
Consistent with the findings of the ERG, the UKOFT recognises that the victims of scammers are not
identifiable by their age, gender, socio-economic stats or educational background. While it is
recognised that gender is not significant to victim status, gender does play a role in the type of scam
that victims might fall for. An example of this is the admission that women were most enticed into
victim status by miracle health scams (71%) while men were most likely to fall victim to high risk
investment scams (72%). Similarly, while socio-economic status is independent of scam victimology,
it is a factor in the type of scam that victims of lower, middle or high social class fall for. Low income
earners and the working class were affected mostly by loan, foreign lottery, career opportunity and
clairvoyant scams while the middle to upper class were more likely to become victims of African
advance fee, property investment and high risk investment scams. A clear separation between the
class of the recipient and the type of scam that they fall victim to is apparent. In the case of low
income earners and the working class, they are most likely to fall victim to those scams that offer
opportunity such as employment and prizes while the middle to high income earners are most likely
to fall victim to investment style scams where they need to outlay an higher amount of money up
front. It is also worth noting that while equality of rights movements have advanced the social
standing of women in the workforce, the majority of women sit in the working class to middle band
of social status, this may be why for this representative sample those scams exploiting female and
male tendencies are also separated by social standing.
The methods of data collection used by the UKOFT (2006) were focus discussions, in depth
interviews, omnibus surveys, and telephone interviews. The results suggest that approximately 48%
of the UK populous had been targeted by a scam in the past and an estimated 3.2 million people
would become tricked by scammers on average per year. The separation of those people who were
targets of scams compared to those people who were became victims is similar to that of the
ABSPFR (2008) pertaining to scam exposure and scam victimisation. A challenge faced by researchers
was the admission or realisation by participants that they may have become a victim of a scam while
it is reported that in less than 5% of cases, a scam will be reported to the authorities.
In 2009, the UKOFT released an inquiry into the Psychology of Scams (Lea et al., 2009). The report
identified similarities between legitimate product marketing techniques and illegitimate product
marketing approaches suggesting that scammers adopt common processes models for illegitimate
product exploitation. Similarly, Choo et al (2009) propose the criminological use of standardised
business processes in the development and implementation of scamming campaigns. A mixed
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methodology involving four approaches; in depth interviews, text mining, questionnaires, and
behavioural experimentation were used.
The report documented and analysed the psychological principles involved in 10 scams: advance fee
419 scams, international sweepstake claims, fake clairvoyant scams, prize draw pitch scams, get rich
quick scams, bogus investment scams, bogus lottery scams, miracle health cure scams, premium rate
prize draw scams, and bogus racing tipster scams (Lea et al., 2009). Identifying the primary
psychological tactics employed by scammers as the triggering of visceral processes, norm activation,
perception of authority, reduction of motivation for information processing, and liking and similarity.
Lea et al. (2009) suggest that visceral processes are activated by a reference to a large reward – such
as those demonstrated by lottery and prize scams, norm activation uses the exploitation of human
desires to achieve a desired response and outcome - such as the desire to work from home and
make a lot of money with little outlay as with employment or investment scams, fear or urgency
result in the diminished activation of information processing – as seen with phishing and death
threat scams, while liking and similarity refer to the relatable ability of the scammer to empathise
with the victim – common to Nigerian letter and romance scams.
The results and approaches used by different reporting agencies from various institutions and
numerous countries have been presented above. These reports suggest that public, social and
industry awareness of scams is growing and they also dispel some myths as to the likely targets and
majority of victims of scams. Each reporting institution utilised their own definitions and criteria for
examining the incidence of scams in their country and jurisdictions with varying foci for their
investigations. The competing terminologies and mixed understandings of the language used to
describe scamming events amount to discrepancies in scam report data both within jurisdictions and
across national borders. The borderless nature of these crimes is an indication of the type of
approach that is needed to combat the issue. While the authorities and reporting agencies continue
to work autonomously and independently little progress can be made towards combating these
crimes. Below is a more in depth examination of the methodologies adopted by each of the
reporting institutions detailed above and a case is developed for the necessity of reform.
1.2.5 Approach Comparison and Description Discrepancies
A comparison of the methods used by each of the four reporting institutions detailed above; the
ABS, ERG, iC3 and OFT is presented below in Table 4 along with the number of scams identified by
each report. It is shown that both the ABS and ERG used telephone interviews for the collection of
data, the iC3 collated data from victim self reports while the OFT used a variety of methods to collect
data; focus group, in depth interview, survey and telephone interview. The number of identified
scams associated with each group is different for each reporting institution and is a reflection of the
priority focus of each institution. The ABS was only concerned with ‘Personal Fraud’ and reported
upon 9 different scam types. The ERG was concerned with mass marketed scams and identified 12
different scams within this category. The iC3 receives reports on all types of computer crime while
reporting upon those scams that are referred onto other law enforcement authorities for further
investigation and as such only the tope ten scams for the annum are discussed. The OFT released
two separate reports; one on mass marketed scams and one on the psychology of scams, these two
reports combined identified 25 scams.
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Table 4: Method Comparison by Reporting Institution
The results of the iC3, ABS, OFT and ERG pertain only to the population from which they were
sampled. For this reason, along with the different scam-type foci apparent between reporting
groups it is difficult to make cross-border comparisons or acquire a true representation of the impact
that scams have on business, law enforcement, the individual, family, and the community in each
country that they belong. These barriers make it challenging to interpret the results in a real world
or useable context. Further to these interpretation inconsistencies, the complexity and fluidity of
scams is not represented in any of these reports which are often heavily relied upon as a point of
reference by state and federal agencies.
Scammers benefit from a borderless advantage while investigative and enforcement agencies are
stifled by the cross-jurisdictional nature of scams. To monitor, intercept and prosecute scammers it
is necessary for cross-border liaisons to be strengthened and for the enhancement of transnational
efforts which cannot be achieved without a common language of scams (Stabek et al., 2009). Some
of these problems manifest in similarity amongst scam descriptions, as well as over simplified scam
descriptions.
“Confidence Fraud results in the financial loss of an individual who has been swayed to act to their detriment through a
breach of trust in a relationship. “
“Credit / Debit Card Fraud occurs when there has been unauthorised use of a credit card.”
“Computer Fraud is the violation of law involving a computer. “
“Identity Theft is the unauthorised use of another’s particulates”
(IC3, 2008)
Figure 7: IC3 Scam Definitions
The above examples given in Figure 7 demonstrate some of the similarities in scam definitions for
the IC3 alone. The category of Confidence Fraud could imply all forms of scam since all scams
contain the crucial element; breach in a relationship or transaction. Credit/Debit Card fraud could
easily be confused with Identity Theft since Identity Theft is only defined as the unauthorised use of
another persons details and the unauthorised use of another persons credit or debit card is the
unauthorised use of another’s particulates. And finally, since Computer Fraud is defined as the
violation of law involving a computer, and all Internet and computer based scams involve the use of
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a computer in their perpetration, all scams and frauds perpetrated through the use of such
technologies can be described by this one definition.
“Advance Fee Loan Fraud occurs when a loan is offered in return for the payment of an advance fee.”
“Upfront Fee for Credit Card Fraud occurs when a credit card is offered in return for the payment of an advance fee.”
“Advance Fee Vacation Fraud occurs when a discounted vacation is offered in return for the payment of an advance fee.”
“Prize Lottery or Sweepstakes Fraud occurs when a prize is offered in return for the payment of an advance fee.”
(ERG, 2008)
Figure 8: ERG Scam Definitions
The above examples in Figure 8 demonstrate the issue of over-classification. Advance Fee Loan
Fraud, Upfront Fee for Credit Card Fraud, Advance Fee Vacation Fraud, and Prize Lottery or
Sweepstakes Fraud contain a shared characteristic which underpins the definitions of the scams, this
is something in return for the payment of an advance fee. Based upon the definitions given, these
scams could easily be combined into one category of MMF rather than separated into four separate
groups.
Table 5 below lists all of the scam titles identified by each scam reporting institution discussed in this
chapter. Of the 56 scams reported upon, only one was recognised by an identical title by another
institution. ‘Identity theft’ was labelled ‘identity theft’ by both the ABS and iC3 while no other scam
was recognised by a same title between any of the four institutions or 5 individual reports. Those
scam types that are alike such as ‘Lotteries’ (ABS), ‘Prize, lottery or sweepstakes’ (ERG), ‘Prize draw
sweepstakes’ (OFT2), and ‘Prize draw pitch’ (OFT2) but receive competing labelling dependent upon
institution occur frequently throughout the sample. As demonstrated in the given example, there
are even discrepancies evident between reports issued by the same institution (OFT1, OFT2). These
inconsistencies both within reporting institution – such as that demonstrated by the OFT, and
between reporting institutions impedes current communication channels across national and
international borders. Greater consistency in scamming language would assist towards the
development of a comprehensive scamming lexicon that could be used to assist not only reporting
institutions but local and transnational efforts between law enforcement agencies, financial
institutions, businesses, and investigative and security professionals. Greater consistency means
greater understanding, greater understanding means greater awareness and a greater awareness
means a greater ability to address the issue. These issues are addressed further by the research
goals which are discussed in the following section.
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Table 5: Comparison of Scam Titles and their Reporting Institution
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1.3 Research Goals
There are three goals for this research which all combine to achieve the result of the identification of
hierarchy and homogeneous subsets of scam perpetrations.
Research Objective 1: To cluster scam descriptions by partitioning them into scam genres
revealing homogeneous groups of scam cases.
Methodology Outline 1: This will be achieved by analysing the divisively derived static
features of scam descriptions following the manual content analysis
of publicly available scam descriptions. By means of agglomerative
hierarchical clustering, scam cases will be analysed according to
their divisively derived static feature composition and partitioned
into relatively homogeneous clusters of like scam genres.
Research Objective 2: To measure the effectiveness of using static features in identifying
scam genres, where a scam genre is composed of a scam cases with
similar compositions of static features.
Methodology Outline 2: This will be achieved using a discriminant function analysis which
will test the significance of each static feature on the placement of
scam cases into scam genres, quantising the effectiveness of using
the divisively derived static features for identifying scam genre
membership.
Research Objective 3: To verify the selected hierarchical clustering model which produces
the relatively homogeneous subset of scam genres and is at least
95% reliable. This will ensure that scam genre placement will be
accurate at least 95% of the time.
Methodology Outline 3: This will be achieved by applying discriminant function analysis to
verify the results found from the hierarchical cluster analysis. The
discriminant function analysis will compare the scam-case cluster
assignments from the hierarchical model with the predicted scam
placement from the discriminant function model. The hierarchical
clustering model with an error no greater than 5% and that clusters
scam cases into relatively homogeneous genres will be identified as
the best fitting approach for clustering scam cases from the their
divisively derived static feature composition.
The ability to confidently identify scam genres by scam cases explicitly aligns with Australia’s
National Research Priorities as detailed in the Designated National Research Priority, Research
Priority 4: Safeguarding Australia (ARC, 2009).
1.4 Statement of the Problem
With the global connectedness and mass communicability offered by the Internet and World Wide
Web, a scammer can operate one scam in numerous countries, across several jurisdictions on
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countless victims, in unison, all whilst managing multiple projects in parallel. The complicated
network of scam transactions, cross-jurisdictional technicalities and speed of online banking and
wire transfers aids scammer success, which is realised by authorities with difficulty found in
identifying, tracking and prosecuting scammers. Scam success stories are compounding (IC3, 2001-
2008) and organised cyber-criminal groups and individuals disseminating their scams from single or
multiple locations and defraud victims as far reaching as the connectedness of technology offers
(Choo et al., 2008). The need for interagency communication and cooperation leading towards cross-
jurisdictional, transnational investigative operations is necessary (Choo et al., 2008, Stabek et al.,
2009, and Wahlert, 1998) to combat the pandemic of scam proliferation. The successfulness of scam
campaigns, evidenced by the increasing number of victims and public awareness, due largely to the
speed of connectedness and psychology-driven selling tactics employed by scammers suggests an
adaptation towards a scam management style synonymous with successful business models (Choo
et al., 2008, Hays and Prenzler, 2002 and Stabek et al., 2009).
Without a shared and common lexicon of scam labels and descriptions, communications between
agencies and cross-border cooperation is stifled; the biggest hurdle to overcome in scam
investigation is inconsistent scam classifications (Stabek at al, 2009). Without consistency, a uniform
language of scams cannot be forged and without a common language, ambiguities leading to
interpretational impedances are aiding scammers by enabling their scams in cross-jurisdictional and
multinational platforms.
While there is little research to date to either confirm or deny that scams are developed following
particular business principles Choo et al. (2008), and Stabek et al. (2009) observe that scam
operations are fluid and adaptive to change confirming that organised cyber-criminal groups,
individuals and scammers successfully operate their scams by following proven business models.
Without a complete comprehension of the processes involved in scam transactions, investigators
cannot quantifiably or empirically assess scam situations. Before assessment of scam incidents can
progress to a heightened level of analysis, there needs to be compatible understanding of the scam
event being investigated which involves uniformity in scam descriptions across investigative and
reporting agencies, leading to a shared understanding of scam events across jurisdictions. To the
knowledge of this researcher, no method of scam description standardisation exists.
The problem with a naturally aligning language of scams is that there is too much diversity in
recognised scam types across countries, borders and jurisdictions. This research aims to condense
identifiable and publicly recognised scam events into homogeneous clusters of scam genres which
will assist in the identification of scam categories. This will contribute to the development of a
uniform lexicon of scam terminology as well as become foundational to further research on the
impact of scams at a local and global level.
1.5 Research Problems
This research addresses three research problems. The first focuses on the richness of the source
data and questions the usefulness of using scam static features in determining scam group
membership. The second research problem addresses the issue of the method of classification. Due
to the empirically devised fraud hierarchy, it is logically deduced that a hierarchy of scams also
exists; therefore, this research component focuses on the efficacy of using hierarchical cluster
analysis for the grouping of scam static features. The third and final research problem focuses on the
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validation of the hierarchical model produced from research problem two which is validated through
the use of discriminant function analysis.
1.5.1 Homogeneous Grouping Problem
The homogeneous grouping problem explores the suitability of hierarchical cluster analysis in
partitioning scam cases into scam genres. Four hierarchical linkage methods; furthest neighbour,
between groups, within groups, and nearest neighbour, and two binary distance measures; Jaccard
coefficient and Simple Matching coefficient have been identified for comparison in this research
with a supplementary aim of identifying which combination of method of linkage and measure of
distance best partitions scam descriptions into homogeneous groups and creates the ‘best solution’.
The concept of ‘best solution’ is been defined as a result which partitions scam cases into the fewest
number of groups with the least number of scam cases allocated to each group, being therefore,
relatively homogeneous.
1. Which binary linkage method (furthest neighbour, between groups, within groups, and
nearest neighbour linkage) and binary distance measure (Jaccard or Simple Matching) best
partitions scam descriptions into relatively homogeneous groups?
a. Which cluster result contains the fewest number of groups with the least number of
scam descriptions allocated to each group?
1.5. 2 Static Feature Selection Problem
The static feature selection problem explores the usefulness of scam static features in determining
scam group membership and involves the determination of required static features bearing
significantly on the placement of scam cases into scam genres.
2. Can static features be used to determine scam group membership of scam descriptions?
a. How many static features are required to determine scam group membership?
b. What static features are useful in determining scam group membership?
1.5.3 Minimum Cluster and Least Membership Problem
The minimum cluster and least membership problem considers the usefulness of discriminant
function analysis in predicting and comparing scam group membership of the hierarchical clustering
models. This problem requires the resultant conclusion to contain the fewest number of scam
clusters and least number of scam cases in each cluster. A tolerance limit has been set for accepted
amount of unexplained variation which is 5%. This means that for the selected clustering model, the
best solution containing the least number of clusters and the fewest number of scam descriptions in
each cluster should be able to accurately predict scam group membership at least 95% of the time.
3. Can a discriminant function analysis be used to predict scam group memberships for the
hierarchical cluster solutions with the fewest number of clusters and least number of scam
cases in each cluster to determine which solution accurately predicts scam group
memberships at least 95% of the time?
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1.6 Project Contributions and Chapter Summary
This research will contribute to scam and fraud literature as well as extend on current scam and
fraud research methodologies. The methodology provided here offers a template for future
cybercrime classification work and will be useful to the development of a National Cybercrime
Reporting Service. Further to this, reduction of scam events into homogeneous scam clusters will
assist investigative and enforcement agencies by reducing time, money and resources spent on scam
case investigations. It is also hoped that the results from this research will lead the way towards a
common scam lexicon and in turn enhanced coordination and cooperation in transnational
taskforces.
In this introductory chapter evidence has been presented for the need to focus research on the
incidents of scams and a case has been built urging for reform in the field of scam research. It has
been demonstrated that there currently exists contradiction and inconsistency amongst scamming
terminology both at institutional levels and across national borders. A consistent lexicon of
scamming terminology has been identified as necessary in propelling research forward and
enhancing communication, cooperation and understanding between law enforcement authorities,
financial institutions and businesses which in turn would assist in the strengthening of transnational
investigative efforts. The research agenda of this thesis has been outlined presenting the goals and
research questions for this research. There are three primary research questions and areas of focus;
1) the usefulness of divisively derived static features in hierarchically clustering scam cases, 2) the
identification of the best hierarchical model from a total of 8 different models which clusters scam
cases relatively homogenously, and 3) the verification of hierarchical model which best clusters scam
cases into relatively homogenous clusters, accurate at least 95% of the time. The rest of this thesis is
organised into four sections; Literature Review, Methodology, Results and Discussion.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Defining Scams
Lack of uniformity causing inconsistencies in scam classification has been identified as an ongoing
concern since the 1990’s (Wahlert, 1998) and is regularly identified as a primary cause of
discrepancy in victim self report data (ACPR and AUSTRAC, 2006, Choo et al., 2008, Stabek et al.,
2009). A recent article (Stabek et al., 2009) presents strong evidence citing the breadth of variation
in scam classification among international and national scam reporting institutions. It is suggested
that such wide inconsistencies cause reduced rates of scam identification and low rates of
interception by law enforcement agencies, which results in low prosecution rates of scammers.
Confusion, uncertainty, and false negatives are the consequences scam description discrepancies in
scam classifications. These outcomes lead to more complex concerns, such as the under reporting of
scam incidence, reduced rates of successful follow up by investigative and enforcement agencies and
difficulty in making correct referrals (Denman et al, 2004, Dolan, 2004, Hays and Prenzler, 2002, Lea
et al., 2009, and Wahlert, 1998). There are blurred boundaries within scam classifications which are
inherent throughout anti-fraud legislation (Cybercrime Act, 2001) which the criminals seem to
exploit to their advantage (Choo et al., 2008) and confusion and uncertainty also exists for
transnational investigative bodies dealing with the complexities of working beyond home borders
and interacting with multiple jurisdictions (Wahlert, 1998, and Stabek et al., 2009).
In this chapter scams are defined in terms of technology enhanced and technology enabled crimes. A
modified model of technology based crimes is defined and it is suggested that this is necessary for
the purposes of inclusionary research pedagogy in the field of scams investigation. An overview of
scam-based research is delivered which is separated into subsections headed by the type of scam
each research team focused on.
2.2 TEAC versus TEHC
According to the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) (Choo et al., 2008), there exist two types of
technology based crimes, syntactic; crimes in which technology is the target of the scam, and,
semantic; crimes in which the user is the target of the scam. Within the category of semantics, two
groups of crime emerge; these are technology-enabled crimes (TEAC) and technology-enhanced
crimes (TEHC), this distinction is represented figuratively below in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: AIC Technology Based Crime Flow Chart
According to the AIC (Choo et al., 2008), a technology-enabled crime (TEAC) is a crime in which
technology is necessary for its implementation, while a technology-enhanced crime (TEHC) is a crime
where technology is used as a facilitator of the crime. A distinction can be drawn between
technology required for the commission of crimes; TEAC, and technology useful in the
implementation of crimes; TEHC. Use of technology is necessary for TEAC, while the use of
technology makes a crime easier to commit for TEHC.
With the adoption of technology for the perpetration of scams and the increasing evidence
suggesting that scams are becoming technology driven (IC3, 2008, and ABS, 2007), cyberscams are
overwhelmingly taking the place of more traditional-based scamming tactics (Choo et al., 2008, and
Denman et al., 2004). Cyberscams are Internet assisted scams and fundamentally, cyberscams
contain characteristics compliant to both TEAC and TEHC. Scams communicated through alternative
and more traditional methods such as face to face interactions – similar to the fraud types defined in
Chapter 1 (D) often also extend into the use of technology for communications and funds transfers.
Regardless of this, the definition offered by the AIC only recognises Internet assisted scams as TEAC
type scams (Choo et al., 2008).
Cyberscams, or Internet assisted scams have long been known as traditional crimes perpetrated
through the use of computer technology (Choo et al., 2008, and Wahlert, 1998). An example of a
traditional scam is the Ponzi scam. Similar to the Pyramid scam, this type of scam has been known to
authorities since 1919 when Charles (Carlos) Ponzi pioneered the first recorded Ponzi scam with his
investment company; The Security Exchange Company. Ponzi offered investors a minimum 50%
return on reserves within the first 90 days of investment (USH, 2009). Late 2008, Bernard Madoff
was arrested with multiple charges of fraud and criminal offences. Through his NASDAQ stock
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exchange dealings (Creswell and Thomas, 2009), Madoff defrauded his clients by an estimated
$US50 billion in a Ponzi-style investment scam. A traditional scam operating successfully (for a time)
eighty-plus years after its debut. Even though these cases and others like them operate successfully
with and without the use of computer technology, those perpetrated through the use of such are
recognized as TEAC; where the target of the crime is the end-users machine, rather than TEHC;
where the target of the scam is the end user which is concerning since a Ponzi scam clearly targets
the person and not their computer. The description separating TEAC from TEHC leads to confusion
over the correct categorisation of scams in general.
For the AIC, technology based crimes are defined by two criteria. The first criteria focuses on the
initial target of the scam and this could either be the user (semantic) or machine (syntactic). The
second criterion is the level of technological dependence; enhanced or enabled. The very nature of a
syntactic crime suggests that technology is required during the inception, creation and dissemination
of the scam. Since technology is necessary for the commission of a syntactic crime, these crimes
clearly belong to TEAC. For the purposes of this research, the relationship between the ‘target’ and
level of ‘technology dependence’ is demonstrated in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Redefined Technology Based Crime Flowchart
In this re-arrangement, the distinction between the ‘target’ and the level of ‘technology
dependence’ is still present, however, rather than the target of the scam featuring as the first
criterion for scam separation as it does with the AIC definition, it is substituted with the level of
‘technology dependence’ to form the first criterion within all technology based crimes. The re-
ordering of ‘target’ and level of ‘technology dependence’ is necessary to form a useful definition of
scams and Internet assisted scams that will be helpful in the identification of all scams rather than
just certain types of scams. By rearranging these criterions the mistake of syntactic scam exclusion
from this and future research will be avoided.
2.3 Retrospection
During 1998 Glenn Wahlert from the Australian Federal Police (AFP) presented a paper at the
Internet Crime Conference (ICC), which was hosted by the AIC in Melbourne, Victoria. Primary
concerns surrounding the growing trend of reliance on technology for businesses, the finance sector
as well as general private use were raised (Wahlert, 1998). The issues discussed were highly
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pronounced within then-current scam survey results which were derived from victim report data
and sourced from around the globe. During this time, technology based crime was predominantly
recognised as TEAC and these were such things as virus infection and hacking. Wahlert (1998)
extended the concept of technology based crimes beyond tech-as-target crimes to include
semantically driven tactics and identified the banking and finance sectors, counterfeiting, sexually
related crimes, gambling, and tactical intelligence as future targets of cyber-engaged criminals.
Wahlert (1998) recognised four themes supporting the development and dissemination of Internet
assisted scams; anonymity, mass communicability, jurisdictional impedances, and cultural
ambiguities, suggesting that these areas were in need of urgent attention. It was predicted that a
surge in cyber-criminal behaviour would be imminent suggesting that technology based crime would
thrive with an identified focus on scam based tactics (Wahlert, 1998).
Wahlert (1998) suggested that effective mechanisms for the identification and monitoring of
technology based crime were necessary for controlling its exploitation, further to this, it was
recommended that the development of transnational agencies authorised to operate cross-
jurisdictionally were imperative to fight the phenomena. Inter-agency cooperation and transnational
coordination were identified as fundamental to the development of successful transnational
operations, following the development of a shared language with which to correctly identify and
monitor cases of technology based crime. More than a decade has passed since these revelations
were made and resistance towards a consistent and uniform scam lexicon is still apparent (ACPR and
AUSTRAC, 2006, Lea et al., 2009, Hays and Prenzler et al., 2002, and Stabek et al., 2009).
Stabek et al. (2009) recognise the breadth in scam descriptions and through a critical analysis of
reports produced by the ABS, IC3, and the ERG, a compelling case was made justifying the need for a
Consistent Cyberscam Classification Framework (CCCF). The authors suggest that scammers operate
with three primary goals; of information gathering, participation seeking and financial gain (Stabek
et al., 2009). It was suggested that information based scams target the recipient’s personal data and
scams falling into this category were identity theft and phishing scams. Participation seeking scams
were described by money transfer, laundering and re-shipper scams and financial gain scams were
described as possessing ‘hit-and-run’ style tactics where the scammer and victim are involved in a
once off transaction.
Using these three goals; information – participation - money, complex scams can be described. An
example of a complex or multi-goal scam is the upfront fee for loan or credit card scam. In this scam,
the receiver is required to provide all personal and financial details to the scammer as well as pay an
upfront fee. Here, the scammer’s goal of information gathering is realised while the goal of financial
gain from the up front payment is achieved.
2.4 Scams in Research
Scams are a tool for exploiting individuals; they are used by the criminal element to trick
unsuspecting people into giving up something of value, whether it is money, information, or their
time. Scams are assisted by the use of the internet and computer technology and can be either
syntactic or semantically driven. The appearance of all scam types equally in research literature is
unprecedented and the most commonly researched scams are internet auction scams, phishing
scams, spam scams, Nigerian 419 scams, and advance fee fraud scams.
The Effectiveness of using Static Features in Identifying Scam Genres
25
2.4.1 Internet Auction Scams
An Internet auction scam comes in five forms; shill bidding, bid shielding, merchandise non-delivery,
payment non-delivery, and product authenticity (Dolan, 2004). These can also occur at the delivery
phase of the scam involving fake escrow services or non-existent courier services. For the following
explanation, let: a →e = the type of internet auction scam, x = the perpetrator and y = the victim.
These definitions are described further in Figure 11.
i. a= shill bidding: x = seller, y = customer
ii. b = bid shielding: x = customer, y = seller
iii. c = merchandise non delivery: x = seller, y = customer
iv. d = payment non delivery: x = customer, y = seller
v. e = product authenticity: x = seller, y = customer
Figure 11: Internet Auction Scams Defined
In a shill bidding scam the victim is the customer and the scammer is the seller. It involves the
cooperative efforts of a team of individuals or the use of falsified identities where the aim of the
scam is to drive up the bidding prices of auction items. In bid shielding the roles of the victim and the
perpetrator are reversed, the scammer is the customer, the victim is the seller. These scams involve
the cooperation between two or more individuals, or the use of falsified identities. The buyer and an
associate work together by outbidding each other for an auction item, the highest bidder (the
associate) drops out of the auction at the last minute and the scammer claims the item at the lower
price. For merchandise non-delivery, the victim is the customer and the scammer is the seller, the
customer sends the required funds for the purchase of an auction item and the goods are never
received. With payment non-delivery, the customer is the scammer and the seller is the victim. The
seller forwards the sold goods and the customer receives the goods while revoking payment for the
purchased items. In the case of product authenticity, the seller is the scammer and the customer is
the victim. The seller misleadingly advertises their goods as something that they are not and the
customer is led falsely to believe that they are bidding on a genuine item (Dolan, 2004).
Internet auction scams can be complex and difficult to analyse because the roles of the victim and
the scammer are not constant for all cases. The complexity of internet auction scams also increases
with the malleable nature of these scams and the ability of a scam to start as one type of scam and
transform into another. An example of this complexity can be demonstrated with a scam that starts
as a shill bidding scam where a buyer and an accomplice work together to drive up the selling price
of an item and then when the item does not arrive to the purchaser, a merchandise non-delivery
scam has occurred. If no accomplice has been used during the shill bidding component of the scam
and a false identity has been created to assist in the scam, then other criminal acts have occurred
and the scam is no longer a fraudulent case alone, rather, an identity crime which may also involve
identity theft and identity fraud; where identity theft is the fraudulent attainment of another
persons personal information and identity fraud is the fraudulent use of such personal information
(ACPR and AUSTRAC, 2006).
Much of the research to date on internet auction scams involves detailed case study analysis of the
victims of such scams (Dolan, 2004). Dolan (2004) analyses the demographics of internet auction
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scam victims through surveying known victims. The results suggest that over 60% of victims are
Bachelor Degree educated or higher with almost 70% of victims being aged between 25 and 45 years
old. Merchandise and payment non-delivery scams were the most common methods of fraudulent
activity experienced by the survey respondents with 67.3% falling within this category and eBay was
the most used auction platform at 73.5%. Dolan (2004) recommends that the introduction of a
centralised and dedicated Internet auction fraud investigative team and reporting system is
necessary to increase identification, monitoring and removal of fraudulent activities from Internet
auction host Websites.
Due to the variant nature of internet auction scams, it is difficult to achieve a consistent and reliable
real-time scam detection rate. Chau and Faloutsos (2005) suggest a method to increase the
detection rate of auction fraudsters. The research involved the extraction of features from Internet
auction seller histories to systematically identify and detect fraudulent cases. Up to 17 features were
identified from 115 eBay user accounts which included 43 known fraudster accounts. Features were
extracted from publicly available transaction histories and these features were such constructs as
the dollar amounts of purchases, fluctuations in sell prices, and transaction frequencies. The
dependent variable for each of three experimental runs was the number of features; 8, 16, and 17
respectively. For each experimental run, cross-fold evaluation involving decision tree analysis was
performed and an 83% true-positive identification rate of known frauds was achieved from the 17-
feature experimental run, 80% accuracy for the 16-feature experiment and 75% on the 8-feature
experiment (Chau and Faloutsos, 2005).
Chau and Faloutsos (2005) recommend future research to focus upon the criminal management of
fraudulent scams, and it is suggested that greater insight into the processes involved in the lifecycle
of scams would have a positive impact on identifying, monitoring and intercepting scam transactions
which would save victims and businesses greatly.
2.4.2 Phishing Scams
A phishing scam involves the misrepresentation of a trusted host to encourage recipients to divulge
their personal or private information. The type of information usually sought is private details such
as bank account numbers and passwords and personal details such as full name and date of birth.
These scams are most often associated with, but not limited to financial institutions such as banks
and credit unions. The scammers contact their victims through an email which usually closely
resembles that of a financial institution, or other reputable industry or business. Whether or not the
receiver of the phishing email is associated with the institution is of calculated consequence and
little risk to the scammer since these scams are dispersed in such large quantities through
unsolicited spam emails that the scammers are guaranteed to reach some genuine customers of the
targeted institution. The phishing email will raise concern over the receivers account information
and request verification of account details. It will be suggested that this can be achieved if the
receiver clicks on the associated link contained within the email which will direct the receiver to a
spoofed or falsified Website. Due to the speed of connectivity and low cost of scam dispersion, the
scammers do not require all email receivers to respond to the communication for the scam to be a
success. These scams often mark the collection phase of much larger scams and open a doorway to
more complex scams such as identity fraud, impersonation, overdrawn accounts, money laundering ,
credit card applications, and falsified loans (Moore and Clayton, 2007).
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Moore and Clayton (2007) investigate the usefulness of phishing site removal procedures in
protecting banking customers from fraudulent banking Websites. Through their analysis of visitor
frequencies and phishing Website take-down times, Moore and Clayton (2007) suggest that the
length of time a phishing site is active corresponds with the state of the phishing attack. Data was
collected from participating Web hosts which allowed access to their host-phishing statistics. Using a
purpose developed testing system, 700 phishing Websites were analysed. It was found that on
average, phishing sites remained operational for up to 57 hours and attracted responses from over
30 victims. An analysis of visitor frequencies and length of activation time confirmed that timely
phishing Website removal could assist in combating phishing attacks (Moore and Clayton, 2007).
Weaver and Collins (2007) perform a capture-recapture method of analysis on Internet phishing
activity and cluster phishing sites according to scam genres. The authors separate phishing activities
from other scam events by rating each site on its likelihood of hosting a phishing scam. The authors
suggest that since successful phishing campaigns require the public advertisement of the site,
phishing scams are distinct from all other scams (Weaver and Collins, 2007). Phishing sites were
clustered by the selected features; target, URL, and address, performing capture-recapture
estimation to analyse the ratio of phishing content. Four types of phishing scams were identified;
isolated, persistent, bursty, and corrupt. Isolated phishing scams were described as short lived and
limited to a few scam genres; persistent phishing scams were also limited by genre type though
these scams lasted longer than isolated phishing scams. Bursty phishing scams could have numerous
scam genres, though brief in duration. Finally corrupt phishing scams were similar to bursty scams
while experiencing longer life-cycles (Weaver and Collins, 2007). These experimental results
demonstrated that only 40% of phishing-style scams were positively identified by their host Website
and 60% remained undetected.
Jagatic et al. (2007) explored the social data mining context of phishing by harvesting publicly
available personal and relationship based data by investigating the accounts on social networking
sites. The authors explored the gullibility of individuals by applying a experimental phishing attack on
a selected population for which they were able to obtain the most social and personal information.
Comparisons were made between a control group and a socially engineered experimental group.
The results establish that while 16% of participants in the control group responded to the phishing
scam by supplying the sought information and 72% of those in the socially engineered group
responded with their personal details (Jagatic et al., 2007). While the researchers received ethical
approval and full support from their research institution to carry out this research, the reaction
received by those involved afterwards suggests that a great weakness in personal security was
exposed.
2.4.3 Spam Scams
A spam campaign involves random bulk email dispersion. The scammers might purchase the email
addresses of known end-users or they might access the email list of a business or industry. Spam
emails are synonymous with mass marketing scams, phishing scams, chain mail and syntactic
attacks. The aim of a spam scam is to trick an end-user into responding to a communication.
Anderson et al. (2007) explore the business methods adopted by spammers by identifying the
infrastructure of scam hosts. The authors developed a technique of mining spam scams in real time
by clustering destination Websites. The real-time mining of spam scam is achieved through a
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technique called ‘Spamscatter’ before the clustering of destination Websites. From a sample of
36,390 unique URL’s, 2,334 scams were discovered on 7,029 different machines. Spam scams were
found to contain regular content such as watches, pharmacy, software, male enhancement,
phishing, and Viagra (Anderson et al., 2007) and it is concluded that almost all spam campaigns
expire in less than 3-days (99%), while most last less than 2-days (90%), and at least 50% are short
lived, lasting no more than 12 hours.
Calais et al. (2008) propose a methodology for characterising similar spamming campaigns. They use
frequent tree patterns and attribute association analysis to cluster spamming campaigns. The
campaign goal and method were identified as target features along with language, layout and URL’s.
Minor scam differences were ignored with the goal of minimising the effect of spam obfuscation.
The results of this research demonstrate that data mining techniques are useful in determining
spammer behavioural patterns (Calais et al. 2008).
“ScamSlam: An Architecture for Learning the Criminal Relations behind Scam Spam” by Airoldi and
Malin (2004) proposes the use of purpose built software to discover the origins and criminal cells
involved in the dissemination and perpetration of scam prototypes. The program contains two
distinct stages; filtering and clustering. Spam emails are first filtered using a Poisson classifier which
identifies the likelihood that a message is a scam by assessing its probability status based upon the
number of words within the message. A message is labelled a scam if the counts of words are
greater than the probability of it being a scam than not being a scam. Airoldi and Malin (2004)
assume that counts occur according to the Poisson distribution (1):
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And, rm is the ratio used to determine whether or not a message is more likely to be a scam than it is
not (3):
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If it was found that rm was greater than 1 for any message, that message would be classified as a
spamming communication. Following the classification and identification stage, those scamming
communications that were positively identified as spam were then clustered using un-supervised
hierarchical cluster analysis and a single linkage method with the following distance measure (4):
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A sample of 500 scam campaign-based emails was tested. The filtration phase of ScamSlam
correctly identified 99% of all scam-based spam messages (Airoldi and Malin, 2004). From the
clustering phase of ScamSlam it is learnt that a minimum of 50% of the tested spam scam messages
could be traced back to 20 individuals or criminal cells (Airoldi and Malin, 2004).
2.4.4 Nigerian 419 Scams
In Nigeria, all cyberscams are pursuant under the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Offences Act of 2006
while scams and what is commonly referred to as Nigerian Fraud are pursuant under section 419 of
the Nigerian Criminal Law Act (Dyrud, 2005, and Glickman, 2005). A 419 scam is most often received
by spam email. It will detail a story of misfortune and seek to appeal to empathetic and
opportunistic personalities (Lea et al, 2009). These scams promise great financial reward for ongoing
monetary assistance and can start as a random email that the recipient was ‘lucky’ to receive or may
begin as another scam such as a romance scam and turn into an ongoing emotional and financial
drain for the victim. There are many guises and themes of Nigerian 419 Scams but the commonality
is that the victim will receive nothing whilst losing everything. There are numerous terms used
interchangeably when describing a 419 scam and these are, and not limited to; Nigerian letter, 419,
Nigerian fraud, advance fee fraud, and West African fraud.
Dyrud (2005) performs case-study analyses on Nigerian 419 Scams and recognises a number of
identifiable persuasive techniques used by scammers in their 419 scams. Over one hundred 419
email scams were analysed spanning across 10 months. Dyrud (2005) manually analysed each 419
email noting that the highest traffic of 419 communications was during the month of February (n =
20). The most prominent type of 419 scam was the investment style scam (n = 47 scams), followed
by estate scams (n = 46 scams) and lottery-style scams (n = 18). ‘Ad miseriocordium’ – an appeal for
pity as well as trust are cited as primary psychological tools in the 419 scammer’s toolbox (Dyrus,
2005). For a 419 scam involving ad miseriocordium, an email would be received from someone in an
obvious role of authority. It would describe a horrific situation or event which would appeal to the
receiver’s sense of pity and empathy (Dyrud, 2005). A 419 scam designed to appeal to the receivers
trust involved the misrepresentation of a situation in which the sender was relying on and ‘trusting’
in the receiver. In these situations, Dyrud (2005) reports that scammers were asking for trust from
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their victim by implying that they had bestowed their trust in them, implying that a reciprocal
relationship should follow. The concept of psychological attribute analysis is strengthened by the
UKOFT’s research on The Psychology of Scams (Lea et al., 2009).
2.4.5 Advance Fee Fraud Scams
Advanced fee fraud scams require the recipient or applicant to pay a fee in advance for a service
which is never received or is not what was described. These scams can operate alone or as a
subsidiary component to more advanced scams. A qualitative analysis investigating over 400
advance fee fraud scams found that specific writing techniques were used to illicit a desirable
response from the receiver (Holt and Graves, 2007). It was suggested that by developing an
understanding and a methodology for examining the persuasive language employed in advance fee
fraud scams, insight into the reasons behind victim responses may be learned. Using a grounded
theoretical approach, Holt and Graves (2007) analysed advance fee fraud scam content identifying
key static features through a manual analysis of each scam.
By categorising the scams based upon their derived static feature content, the authors identified 14
scam types; business solicitation, fixed fee transfer from bank, fixed fee transfer from barrister,
over-drafted contract, charity message, lottery message, fixed fee from government, fixed fee from
citizen, investment, banking transaction, fixed fee transfer to account, fixed fee transfer for
investments, consignment, and fixed fee from diplomat (Holt and Graves, 2007). From their analysis,
Holt and Graves (2007) concluded that advance fee fraud emails share characteristics of deceptive
simplicity, which identifies with the receiver, and use of unique phrases which would give the reader
an impression of authenticity. They also suggest that scam templates may be recycled to suit future
scam campaigns.
2.5 Summary
Scams have been identified in this chapter as belonging to both technology enabled and technology
enhanced crime groups and the structure of the commonly used technology based crime model
supported by the AIC has been reassessed to ensure that syntactically driven scams will not be
excluded from future analysis. The issues relating to technology based scams have been identified as
anonymity, mass communicability, jurisdictional impedances and cultural ambiguities and it has
been recommended that the development of transnational agencies authorised to operate cross-
jurisdictionally are necessary in combating these issues. Further to this, it has also been
acknowledged that inconsistencies in scam descriptions need to be standardised.
Five areas of scamming research have been investigated from internet auction scams, phishing
scams, spam scams, Nigerian 419 scams to advance fee fraud scams. While most scamming research
investigates the areas of phishing and spam, only a snap shot of this research is provided here. Five
different internet auctions scams have been recognised and it has been suggested that the
introduction of a centralised reporting system would assist in the identification, tracking and
interception of scams (Dolan, 2004). It has been reported that feature analysis can assist in achieving
80% accuracy in identifying fraudulent Internet auction scams (Chau and Faloutsos, 2005).
It was discovered from using publicly available frequency data that phishing scams remain active for
up to 3 days (Moore and Clayton, 2007). Through clustering phishing scams by their scam genres it
was demonstrated that by identifying the type of phishing scam a scam belongs to from the four
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possibilities; isolated, persistent, bursty, and corrupt, greater accuracy could be achieved in host site
identification of phishing scams (Weaver and Collins, 2007). Also using publically available data was
Jagatic et al. (2007) who performed a social engineering experiment by researching their selected
sample and targeting those whom provided the most information about themselves on public
Internet forums with an experimental phishing campaign.
Those spamming scam campaigns presented here have been investigated by clustering techniques
to identify business models (Anderson et al. (2007), pattern tree analysis has been used to identify
characteristics of spamming campaigns (Calais et a. 2008), and hierarchical cluster analysis has been
used to identify naturally occurring partitions in scam types by grouping scams according to
similarity (Airoldi and Malin, 2004). Through the use of hierarchical clustering it was established that
scam spam messages could be traced back to 20 independent groups of origin (Airoldi and Malin,
2004).
Case study analysis has been used to analyse Nigerian 419 scams (Dyrus, 2005) with the results
identifying psychological constraints which are exploited by scammers. Grounded theory has also
been used to identify scam static features through a manual content analysis of Nigerian 419 scams
(Holt and Graves, 2007). Advance fee fraud scams have been researched using a qualitative
methodology which involved a manual content analysis of writing styles which identified scam static
features (Holt and Graves, 2007). From the identified scam static features, the authors categorised
scams and identified fourteen types of advance fee fraud scams. A comparative snapshot of the
strengths and weaknesses of the approaches investigated here appear below in Table 6.
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Table 6: Strengths V Weaknesses Table
This overview of scamming research demonstrates that the types of methodologies applied to the
research of scams are varied and widely subjective in nature. Clustering and content analysis are
identified as being favoured approaches amongst the research literature and it is these approaches
that are explored further throughout this research. The following section outlines the goals for this
research and details the research questions in terms of research problems and concludes with the
contributions that this research will make to research literature as well as in practice.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 Introduction
There are numerous approaches detailed in the literature on quantising qualitative data (Agresti,
2002, Aranganayagi and Thangavel, 2009, and Berkhin, 2002, Birzer and Craig-Moorland, 2008,
Calais et al., 2008, Choi, 2008, Fernandez, 2004, Holt and Graves, 2007, and Jie et al., 2004). The
approach applied in this study follows a mixed methodology. The data is collected and stored in
qualitative form, and it is then analysed in a quantitative way resulting in quantitatively derived and
empirically assessed conclusions. The approaches used in this study change throughout the varying
stages of sampling, data identification, data collection, scam identification and scam group
membership verification. Each method used within each data phase is outlined below.
3.1.1 Sampling
The data for this research was conveniently sampled from publicly available information sources
consisting of Internet Websites and published reports. The scam descriptions from 14 sources
belonging to 4 different countries was collected and those countries contributing data for this
research were Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The data
sources were manually inspected to verify their suitability for use of data collection. What
determined source appropriateness was the presence and accessibility of text based scam
descriptions. If an inspected data source did not contain written descriptions of scams listed on their
Website or in their report, the source was discarded from further analysis. Due to the manual nature
of source sampling, it was required that scam descriptions be written in English, and they also had
be publicly available sources so that any member of the public could access them freely.
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Table 7: Contributing Source Scam Frequencies
Of the sources listed above in Table 7, all were found on the Internet through completing a general
search in both Google and Yahoo search engines for topical scam words and phrases such as ‘scam’,
‘fraud’, ‘swindle’, ‘technology based crime’, ‘scammers’, and ‘Internet crime’. Scamwatch, United
States Postal Inspectors Service (USPIS), Looks too good to be true (L2G2BT), Scamsmart, Internet
Crime Complaint Centre (IC3), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), FIDO, On guard online (OGO),
US-Cert (USC), and the Queensland Police Service (QPOL) all  contained Websites with the necessary
information while the Australian Competition and Consumer Crime Commission (ACCC), UK Office of
Fair Trading (UKOFT), Environics Research Group (ERG), and the Australian Bureau of Investigation
(ABS) were text based documents available for download on the Web.
Once a data source was found identified as useful, those scams detailed within the source were
printed along with their source-based categorisation, title and description. The collected scam
descriptions were then manually analysed by content analysis. In total, the sample consisted of 277
individual scam case descriptions, gathered from 14 publicly available sources. Collectively, the data
sources had categorised the 277 scams into 38 different scam types which were later analysed based
upon 82 pre-identified scam static features.
3.1.2 Data Identification
Feature identification has been used in the past in the investigation of scamming events (Chau and
Faloutsos, 2005 and Weaver and Collins, 2007), regardless of this, no comprehensive list of scam
static features relevant to all types of scams is known.  Without a comprehensive list of scam static
features it is difficult to determine scam membership. A purpose developed list of divisively derived
scam static features pertinent to all scam types was subsequently developed which was achieved
using a content analysis, a qualitative, grounded theoretical approach similar to the one used by Holt
and Graves (2007).
By using a grounded theoretical approach, each scam description was regarded in its complete form
and all of the information gathered to compile each scam descriptions therefore had an impact on
the derived scam static features. Through a rigorous bottom-up interrogation similar to the
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approach used by Lamp et al. (2007), the scam static features emerged. While this method is
subjective to pre-identifiable bias; researcher, scam description author location, nationality, and
jurisdiction as well as interpretational ambiguities, the data which would become the static features
for this research was derived from evaluations of scam descriptions and it was guided by pre-defined
source comparative features found in the form of ‘what to watch out for’ statements in the source
data.  Due to this, the ‘what to watch out for’ section of scam descriptions became a useful tool
guiding to identification of scam static features. To explain this further, an example is given below in
Figure 12 which was sampled from the Scamwatch Website.
Warning Signs
 You receive an email or a phone call from somebody saying they are from your bank, asking you about recent
activity on your credit card or account.
 You are asked to confirm your credit card and bank account details by return email, visiting a website or over the
phone.
 The caller or the email claims that there has been fraudulent activity found on your bank account, or that your
card has been cancelled.
 You may be advised to contact a fake fraud investigations body, and discouraged from contacting your bank or
credit union.
 www.scamwatch.gov.au
Figure 12: Example of ‘What to Watch Out For” from the Scamwatch Website
Four key points are identified above advising the reader of things to watch out for if they wish to
avoid becoming involved in a Phony Fraud Alert. The potential victim should be alarmed if they have
received a communication by either email or phone from somebody claiming that they are from
their financial institution. If they are required to provide their banking details because a claim is
made that there has been fraudulent activity on their account and it is implied that the their card or
account will be cancelled. They may then be discouraged to contact their financial institution and to
remain silent about the issue.
From this example, some of the static features derived are the role of the victim – receiver, the
method of scam contact – email or phone, something the scammer claims – from a financial
institution and that there has been fraudulent activity, something the victim is required to do –
provide account details, and scammer tactics to support the success of the scam – discourage the
victim from seeking assistance, and require them to remain silent about the exchange.
Using the pre-identified key features from the data sources, a list of scam static features was
compiled containing 82 individual features from 9 categories of feature-type. Once compiled, a scam
static feature list was used during the examination of each scam description and the presence or
absence of the identified feature within the descriptions was recorded in a progressive spreadsheet
in binary form.
A comprehensive list of scam static features along with feature-type appears in Table 28 (in the
Appendix). The role that a victim could play in a scam was either as a seller, a customer or a client, or
random for un-associated attacks. The method of scam introduction was another feature type, the
scam was either sought by the victim; ticketing scams are an example of this where the victim acts as
customer seeking tickets for an event and unwittingly involves themselves in a scam by purchasing
non existent tickets from a fake ticketing agent. Scams received by the victim can be described to
The Effectiveness of using Static Features in Identifying Scam Genres
36
lottery scams received in the post or by email which suggests that the receiver has won a substantial
prize in a lottery or competition that they have not heard of nor entered. Or, scams that are
introduced to the victim such as those face to face scams like door to door scams offering services
that are never performed or pyramid style investment scams that are most often introduced to the
victim by a friend or a known acquaintance.
The tool for scam proliferation category relates to the method of initial scam receipt, this could have
been achieved in one or a combination of 11 ways from emails to pop-ups, Websites and Internet
forums to face to face introduction, post, telephone and text messages. Seventeen different scam
offers were identified by the data sources and these ranged from human interaction to prizes,
money and merchandise. It was identified that claims were often made by scammers to involve the
receiver in their scam, 12 scam claims were recognised and these ranged from the claim that the
proposal was government approved and legal, or the venture being of little risk, high reward and
effective.
For a scam to be a success, the scammer must acquire what he or she seeks from the receiver, for
this purpose, the ‘what the scam required from the victim’ category was introduced and contains 14
different features ranging from supplying personal and banking details to recruitment of other
people. The ‘method of the scam’ refers to the target of the scam; semantic or syntactic, and the
‘scammers toolbox’ contains the features that are regarded as scamming extras used by scammers
to aid in the success of the scam. This feature type contains 14 static features from the use of a
compromised or falsified Website to paraphernalia, testimonials and story telling strategies.
Finally, the primary target of the scam as reported by Stabek at al. (2009) contained three
categories; information, money and participation. A scam targeting an individual for money and
money alone such as a once off advance fee to claim a non existent prize would be a financial gain
scam, where a scam requesting bank account detail updates might target the gathering of
information, and a scam requiring the involvement of the receiver in any way such as a money
transfer employment style scam would be a participation style scam. Some scams contain more than
one objective such as and advance fee loan scam which requires the payment of an advance fee as
well as the submission of personal details to the scammer, this sort of scam would be a financial gain
and information gathering scam.
3.1.3 Data Collection
Once a comprehensive list of static features was compiled, the collected scam descriptions were
then manually analysed using a content analytical approach and the absence and presence of scam
features was recorded. A content analysis approach has been used by Dyrud (2005) and Holt and
Graves (2007) and is identified a useful approach for investigating scam incidents by Jie et al. (2005).
The process of identifying absent and present scam static features was arduous and time intensive.
The static feature analysis of scam descriptions represented in the vector space contains 277 scam
cases with 82 features for each scam case entry, an example of the vector space model appears
below in Table 8 where the columns represent the features and the rows represent a single scam
case.
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Table 8: Example of Vector Space Model of Scam Cases and Static Features
3.1.4 Scam Group Membership Identification
The interest of this research is in grouping like scams based upon their static features. To achieve
this, cluster analysis is used to partition scams. Various clustering methods have been applied in the
research of scams (Airoldi and Malin, 2004, Anderson et al., 2007, Calais et al., 2008, Chau and
Faloutsos, 2005, Choi, 2008, Dolan, 2004, Dyrud, 2005, Glickman, 2005, Holt and Graves, 2007,
Jagatic et al., 2007, Lea et al., 2009, Losch, 2006, Moore and Clayton, 2007, and Weaver and Collins,
2007). The method used for this analysis is hierarchical cluster analysis and is similar to that
approach used by Airoldi and Malin (2004).
K-means cluster analysis (Abonyi et al., 2007) is one of the most common forms of cluster analysis
and is represented by the following algorithm (5) which aims to cluster N data points into X clusters
with the minimum sum of squares:
(5)
It is a partition-based form or cluster analysis that relies on cluster centres of a pre-specified
number of sought after clusters. It measures the distance between clusters using the Minkowski
metric (6):
dp(xi,xj) =(∑ dk=1 ∣xi,k-xj,k ∣p)1/p=||xi-xj||p
(6)
The Euclidean distance algorithm (7):
d2(xi,xj) =(∑ dk=1(xi,k-xj,k)2)1/2=||xi-xj||2
(7)
Or the Mahalanobis distance (8) algorithm:
dm(xi,xj) = (xi-xj)F-1(xi-xj)T
(8)
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This method of cluster analysis is a partition-based method of cluster analysis unlike agglomerative
hierarchical clustering which, as the name suggests, is an agglomerative method of cluster analysis.
K-means analysis requires data of a continuous or quantitative nature, the researcher must also
know how many cluster they wish to find. For the data being investigated here, there was no
expectation for how many clusters that would be found and it is for these reasons that it was
determined that k-means cluster analysis was not suitable for use on the binary scam data gathered
for this investigation.
Using an unsupervised agglomerative hierarchical cluster approach, starting with all scam cases, like
scam cases are partitioned into analogous groups, this process continues until all scam clusters
merge to form one large and final cluster. Unsupervised agglomerative hierarchical clustering assists
in grouping scams into homogeneous scam genres, since agglomerative clustering is limited by an
inability to divide pre-grouped clusters, it was selected as the optimum method for clustering scam
cases because a logical tie or combination could not be overrun by a future connection. Hierarchical
clustering was also selected as a suitable method for finding homogeneous partitions for this data
set due to the size of the sample collected and because it was unknown how many cluster centres
would be found within the data. Due to this, other forms of cluster analysis were unsuitable. K-
means cluster analysis relies on knowledge of how many cluster centres exist (Agresti, 2002,
Berkhin, 2002, Francetic, 2005 and Witten and Frank, 2000) and the two-step cluster analysis
method requires mixed variables – qualitative and quantitative data. The data for this research is
binary and there is no expectation for the number of cluster centres, therefore, the exploratory
results offered by the unsupervised agglomerative hierarchical cluster procedure, its suitability for
smaller data sets, as well as its appropriateness for binary data meant that this method was the
optimal choice for the clustering of scam cases.
There are 8 different binary distance measures suited for use with exclusively binary data. These are
(Meyer et al., 2004) the Jaccard coefficient:
a/(a+b+c)
(9)
The Sorenson-Dice coefficient:
2a/(2a+b+c)
(10)
The Anderberg coefficient:
a/(a+2(b+c))
(11)
The Ochiai coefficient:
a/( √(a+b)(a+c))
(12)
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The Simple Matching coefficient:
(a+d)/(a+b+c+d)
(13)
The Rogers Tanimoto coefficient:
(a+b)/(a+d+2(b+c))
(14)
The Ochiai 2 coefficient:
(ad)/ c)b)(dc)(db)(a(a 
(15)
The Russel Rao coefficient:
a/(a+b+c+d)
(16)
The two most suited binary distance coefficients to the data type used in this research were
identified as the Jaccard coefficient and the Simple Matching coefficient; these were used for
comparison to identify which was best for binary-vector based scam static feature-based data. The
Simple Matching coefficient gives equal weighting to matches and non matches within the sample
for binary data where 0 = absence and 1 = presence of a value while the Jaccard coefficient  removes
joint absences before giving equal weighting to both matches and non matches (Berkhin, 2002).
While both distance coefficients are suited to binary data, the difference in the way that the zero
response variables are accounted for might impact on the scam group placement and therefore,
both of these distance measures are used and the results compared. A comparative study (Meyer et
al., 2004) analysed the results of eight binary similarity coefficients; Jaccard, Sorensen-Dice,
Anderberg and Ochiai, Simple Matching, Rogers and Tanimoto, Ochiai 2, and Russel and Rao. The
results conclude that similar principles guide each different measure. A distinction was made
between the Jaccard, Sorensen-Dice, Anderberg and Ochiai with the Simple Matching, Rogers and
Tanimoto, and Ochiai 2 coefficients. The first four methods; Jaccard, Sorensen-Dice, Anderberg and
Ochiai ignored zero value co-occurrences while the following three; Simple Matching, Rogers and
Tanimoto, and Ochiai 2 incorporate these into their results. The final coefficient, the Russel and Rao
is limited by the inclusion of co-occurrences in the denominator alone (Meyer et al., 2004).The
Jaccard and the Simple Matching coefficients were selected for comparison because throughout
statistical literature, these two methods are recommended more prominently for use with binary
data (Alhaija and Richardson, 2003, Aranganayagi, Hennig, 2007 and Thangavel, 2009, and Berkhin,
2002).
For each binary distance coefficient, four linkage methods were tested. These were the furthest
neighbour, between groups linkage, within groups linkage, and nearest neighbour coefficients.
These methods were selected because of their suitability for clustering binary data. Furthest
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neighbour linkage is a method of complete linkage. It starts by grouping cases based on their
maximum distance, linking all cases within clustered groups based on the furthest distance cases.
Between groups linkage is a method of average linkage which starts by initially grouping the first set
of cases by the maximum distance then clustering distances are created by calculating the average
distance between all clustered cases. For within groups linkage, also known as centroid linkage,
cases are grouped around the centre, or middle of a formation of clusters. Finally, for nearest
neighbour linkage, also called single linkage, the shortest path between two cases is joined to create
the first cluster and then continues in this manner until all cases are joined (Berkhin, 2002), these
different linkage methods are presented figuratively below in Figure 13 and more descriptively in
Table 9.
A) Furthest Neighbour – Complete Linkage B) Between Groups Linkage – Average Linkage
C) Within Groups Linkage – Centroid Linkage D) Nearest Neighbour Linkage – Single Linkage
Figure 13: Cluster Linkage Methods
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Table 9: Linkage and Distance Measures
Linkage Description Jaccard Simple matching
Nearest neighbour
dist=bcl-acl
distance between the
two closest objects from
clusters a and b
a/(a+b+c),  [0,1] (a+d)/(a+b+c+d), [0,1]
Between groups
dist=suma,b1…k(bfar1-afar2)/n
average distance between
all objects from clusters a
and b
a/(a+b+c), [0,1] (a+d)/(a+b+c+d), [0,1]
Within groups
dist=cclb-ccla
distance between the
centroids of all objects in
clusters a and b
a/(a+b+c), [0,1] (a+d)/(a+b+c+d), [0,1]
Furthest neighbour
dist=bfar-afar
distance between the two
furthest objects from
clusters a and b
a/(a+b+c),[0,1] (a+d)/(a+b+c+d), [0,1]
3.1.5 Scam Group Membership Verification
To assess the results from the hierarchical cluster analysis, a multivariate approach is used through
the use of a discriminant function analysis which is used to determine the suitability of the model
created. Discriminant function analysis has been used in the past by Mauldin (2008), Birzer and
Craig-Moreland (2008) and Pyryt (2004) to predict group membership and ascertain the reliability of
predictive models. Discriminant function analysis is suited to categorical data and assists in
identifying which features are most important to the model. In this case the cluster membership
results from each hierarchical cluster analysis are the dependent variables while the static features
are the independent variables. Birzer and Craig-Moreland (2008) use discriminant function analysis
in policing research to separate interrelating variables and to determine and predict future models
of membership.
3.2 Limitations
The methods selected in this research for data analysis were chosen because they had been
successfully used in the past on either similar data types or in a related field to that being
investigated here. One of the biggest limitations to this research is the subjectiveness and
interpretability of the data during the data identification and data gathering phases. Since this
research was manually sourced, coded and collected, confidence can be gained in a single subjective
and interpretive view which was stable across the whole data identification and data collection
phase. However, this manual process proved time consuming and limiting because the researcher
was limited to English only data sources and bound by time. Given more time and assistance from
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non-English speaking individuals, the scope of the data sources during the data collection phase
could be expanded to include a larger and more representative and comprehensive sample
pertaining to cultural groups and language specificities could be attained. Due to the nature of the
data sources belonging to similar, related or at times the same jurisdictions and countries, there is a
possibility that scam types will be repeated across source platforms. Since scam descriptions are
assumed to be authored by the source agency, this has not become an issue in the consideration of
data suitability because the purpose of this study is to analyse and compare scam types across
related jurisdictions. A key challenge for future research is to identify ways to automate the data
identification and coding processes.
To the knowledge of this researcher, the combination of analyses used in this research on the type
of scam static features derived from those publicly available descriptions has not been attempted
before. Therefore, this study represents an exploratory study into the usefulness of scam static
features in predicting group membership and identifying scam genres. Exploratory analyses are
troubled by concerns with validity, reliability and reproducibility which are the reasons for testing
the reliability of the hierarchical clustering of scam static features using a discriminant function
analysis.
This chapter defines the methodological approaches applied to this body of research and justifies
the selection of the selected methods of analysis; the following chapter, Chapter 6 details the
analysis results. The following chapter details the results from each phase of analysis and concludes
with the most suitable model for identifying scam clusters as well as reporting on those static
features which significantly impact the placement of scam cases into scam genres.
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Chapter 4: Results
4.1 Data Summary
A total of 277 scam descriptions with 82 static features were analysed originating from four different
English speaking countries; Australia, United States of America, United Kingdom, and Canada. Of the
total number of scams recorded, 46.2% were from Australia, 39.7% from the USA, 9.7% from the UK
and 4.3% were from Canada. The agencies from which the scams came and the number of scams
attributed to their source appear in Table 10 below.
Table 10: Scam Frequencies by Source
Scamwatch provides most of the scams for the sample (14.4%) followed by the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) (12.6%). The 38 source-classified categories along
with scam frequency appear in Table 11 below. The scams in the top ten scam categories make up
nearly 73% (73.84) of the sample. The most frequent classification is Internet (n = 35) followed by
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Mass Marketing (n = 26). There were 8 categories that contained no more than 3 scam cases,
combined, these account for up to 10% of the sample. Identity fraud and identity theft were
separated into two separate categories, suggesting that different types of identity focused scams
exist, combined they make up over 5% of the sample.
Table 11: Scam Category Frequencies
Table 12 below gives the frequencies of scam categories by country. All of the scams collected from
Canada were categorised as mass marketing scams (n = 12) and of those scams sourced from the
United Kingdom, 10 were not categorised, while 14 were identified as mass marketing scams, and 3
were career opportunity scams.  The United States had scams classified into 19 different categories.
Internet scams and financial fraud scams contained equal frequencies (n = 19) followed by Email
scams (n = 10), and for this sample, four of those scams analysed received no classification at all.
There were a total of 26 scam categories analysed from Australia and of the 26 categories, Internet
scams contained the greatest frequency (n = 16) followed by investment scams (n = 14) and money
transfer requests (n = 8).
From looking at these figures, conclusions can be drawn about scam emphasis in the source
countries. Australia and the United States identify Internet scams as a type of scam while the United
Kingdom and Canada do not coincide with this categorisation. Similarly, mass marketing scams are
recognised by the United Kingdom and Canada as a scam category but not by Australia or the United
States. Financial fraud appears to be a concern in the United States and small business scams,
mobile phone scams, money transfer requests, banking and online account scams, scams, health and
medical scams, identity theft, chain letter and pyramid scams, affinity fraud, dating and romance
scams, psychic and clairvoyant scams, charity scams, telephone investment scams, door to door
sales fraud, betting and computer software scams, and assassination or extortion scams are targeted
scams within Australia.
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Table 12: Scam Category Frequencies by Country
4.2 Feature Summary
Scam static features were categorised into nine different feature themes (Table 13).  The role that
the victim might play in a scam contained 4 features, the method of scam introduction contained 3
features, the method of scam dissemination was made up of 11 features, what the scam offered to
the recipient contained 17 features, what the scam claimed it could do or offer the victim was made
up of 15 features, what the scam required of its victims contained 13 features, the target of the
scam contained 2 options – syntactic or semantic, the tools or tactics that a scammer incorporated
into their scam contained 14 features, and the goal of the scammer could be one of, or a
combination of 3 options see Table 9 below where 1 = the role of the victim, 2 = the method of
introduction, 3 =the method of dissemination, 4 = what was offered, 5 = what was claimed, 6 = what
was required, 7 = the target, 8 = the scammer’s tools, and 9 = the goal of the scam.
While the identification of scam static features within scam descriptions was a bottom-up,
grounded-theoretical process, the features identified here were assisted by those key points raised
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by each data source in the ‘what to look out for’ section of scam and scam category descriptions. It is
entirely possible that static scam features are not limited to, or defined by the feature scams above.
The importance of a feature for predicting scam membership of scam cases is explored further
during the discriminant function analysis phase of this research.
To demonstrate how a scam can be defined by these static features an example of an internet
auction scam is used. With an Internet auction scam, the victim might seek the scam out by acting as
a customer, the victim therefore searches out the scammer. In this situation the victim who sought
the scam through a website or online auction would be offered merchandise by the scammer. The
scam may have claimed to offer the services of a refund if the victim was dissatisfied with their
purchase, and to process the transaction, the victim may be required to pay for their purchase
upfront and may have also been required to pursue alternative shipment methods to those
ordinarily used by the online auction service. The target of this type of scam is the person not the
machine and the tools that a scammer could use for this sort of scam might be the use of inferior
merchandise or not providing the goods at all. A scammer’s motivation for developing this type of
scam is financial gain rather than information seeking or victim participation.
Table 13: Summary Table of Scam Static Features
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4.3 Model Analysis
Using a minimum of three cluster groups inferred from Stabek et al. (2009), and running a single
agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis on the data for exploration, an upper limit of twelve
cluster genres was identified. The range of cluster membership frequencies gathered for each
hierarchical model was nine and this was the range between twelve and three clusters. The purpose
of this approach was to look for homogeneous sets by identifying which hierarchical cluster solution
contained the least number of clusters with the fewest number of scam cases in each cluster. Two
binary distance measures were tested across four linkage methods. It is hypothesised that a smaller
number of scam clusters can be found than the publicly acknowledged 38 which were recorded
during the data collection phase.
4.3.1 HCA: Furthest Neighbour – Jaccard Coefficient
Bar charts of the selected group number membership frequencies for the furthest neighbour Jaccard
coefficient hierarchical cluster model appear in Figure 14 and the dendrogram for this model can be
seen in Figure 22 which can be seen in further detail at http://www.icsl.com.au/capability/identity-
theft/scams. The bar charts A and B display a negative trend which begins to normalise in chart C. In
chart E, the trend becomes more uniform and a strong negative trend is displayed from charts G
through to J. For the 12-cluster solution, three groups contain 5 scams (clusters one, eight, and ten).
The mode of the distribution is cluster three which contains 51 scam cases, the range of this 12-
cluster solution is 46.
The 11-cluster solution displays similar trends to that of the 12-cluster solution. Clusters one and
eight contain the least number of scam descriptions, 5 and 6 respectively. The modal cluster is the
same for the 11-cluster solution as it is for the 12-cluster solution, cluster number three (n = 51) and
the range is unchanged (n = 46). The 10-cluster solution shows a similarly shaped distribution to that
of the previous 11 and 12-cluster solutions. It has one minimum cluster which contains 5 scam cases
(cluster eight) and the mode is cluster three containing 51 scam cases, the range remains unchanged
(n = 46).
A 9-cluster solution reveals a distribution that is beginning to normalise. The group containing the
minimum number of scam cases has changed from cluster number eight which was stable across
cluster solutions ten, eleven, and twelve to cluster six (n = 7). The mode of the distribution is 50
scam cases and this occurs in cluster three. The stability of cluster three is evident throughout the
results since cluster three has remained the modal cluster for each cluster solution - nine, ten,
eleven, and twelve. The range has changed from 46 scam cases in the previous cluster solutions to
43 in this 9-cluster solution.
The 8-cluster solution reveals a stronger negative trend than the previous nine, ten, eleven, and
twelve cluster solutions. The group with the least number of scam cases is cluster number five (n =
18) followed by cluster one (n = 30). The modal cluster has changed from being consistently cluster
three to cluster two (n = 73). The range has grown from 43 to 55 in this 8-cluster solution model. In
the 7-cluster solution, the cluster memberships begin to even out becoming more uniform. Scam
cluster four contains the least number of scam cases (n = 18), the cluster mode occurs at cluster
number two (n = 73) and this is closely followed by cluster number one with 71 scam cases. The
range is the same for the seven cluster solution as it is for the eight cluster solution (n = 55).
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For the 6-cluster model, a negative distribution is displayed and there is no change in the modal
scam clusters; two and one respectively. The scam cluster with the least number of scam cases is
scam cluster four which remains unchanged from the seven cluster model. Where change is
apparent is for scam cluster three which has grown from 31 scam cases in the seven cluster model to
52 scam cases in the six cluster model. The five cluster solution shows a negative distribution and
some clear changes in scam group memberships. Scam cluster three has become the cluster with the
least number of scam cases (n = 20) and the modal cluster has become cluster one which contains
up to 148 scam cases, the range of this cluster solution is 128.
The 4-cluster solution reveals a strong negative trend. The scam cluster with the least number of
scam cases is cluster number four (n = 20), the mode is scam cluster one (n = 160) and the range is
140. The results for the 4-cluster solution are similar to those found in the 3-cluster solution. A
strong negative trend is evident, the cluster with the least number of scam cases is cluster number
three with approximately 20 scam cases, the mode is cluster number one which remains stable at
160 cases and the range is still 140.
The cluster solutions with the most promising results are those with six, seven, eight, and nine
clusters. This is because these cluster solutions show evidence of homogeneity as the scam cluster
frequencies start to even out across the distribution. The results from cluster number five down to
cluster number three do not provide a useful model that offers distinction between scam
descriptions. This is because of the sheer size of cluster groups which can be recognized by
comparing the ranges of the ten models which appear in Table 14.
The range for each cluster solution remains constant at 46 for cluster solutions ten, eleven, and
twelve. It drops by three scam cases to 43 for cluster solution nine and then increase by 12 scam
cases to a range of 55 for cluster solutions six, seven, and eight. At cluster number five, the scam
range increases from 55 to 128. The scam clustering model which maintains the least amount of
difference and therefore the lowest possible range is the model of most interest to this research;
those cluster solutions are six, seven, eight and nine.
Table 14: Summary Table of Cluster Solutions for the Furthest Neighbour Jaccard Coefficient HCA Model
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4.3.2 HCA: Between Groups Linkage – Jaccard Coefficient
Bar charts of the selected group number membership frequencies for the between groups linkage
Jaccard coefficient hierarchical cluster model appear in Figure 15 and the dendrogram for this model
can be seen in Figure 23. The 12-cluster solution reveals a negative distribution. Seven groups
contain fewer than 5 scams each (one, three, seven, eight, ten, eleven, and twelve). The mode of the
distribution is cluster number two containing 170 scam cases, and the range for this cluster solution
is 165. The 11-cluster solution displays a similar distribution to that of the twelve cluster solution.
Clusters one, three, seven, eight, ten and eleven contain the least number of scam descriptions, less
than 5. The modal cluster is the same for the 11-cluster solution as it is for the t12-cluster solution,
cluster two (n = 170) and the range is unchanged (n = 165). The 10-cluster solution shows a similarly
shaped distribution to that of the previous 11 and 12-cluster solutions. It has five minimum
frequency clusters containing less than 5 scam cases each (one, three, seven, nine, and ten) and the
mode is still cluster two containing 170 scam cases, the range remains unchanged (n = 165).
A 9-cluster solution shows no change in distribution to that of the ten, eleven, and twelve cluster
solutions. The clusters containing the minimum number of scam cases are clusters one, three, six,
eight, and nine with less than 5 scam cases each. The mode of the distribution is 200 and this occurs
in cluster two. The stability of cluster two is evident throughout the results since cluster two has
remained the mode for each cluster solution; nine, ten, eleven, and twelve. The range has changed
from 165 in the previous cluster solutions to 195 in this nine cluster solution. The 8-cluster solution
displays a negative trend. The scam clusters with the least number of scam cases are cluster
numbers one, three, six, and eight, containing no more than 5 scams. The modal cluster is still
cluster number two with 200 scam cases and the range is still 195. In the 7-cluster solution, a
negative distribution is evident. Scam clusters two, five and seven contain the least number of scam
cases (n < 5) while cluster one the cluster with the greatest frequency (n = 210). The range has
increased by 10 cases to 205.
For the 6-cluster model, a negative distribution is also displayed and there is no change in the modal
scam cluster, clusters one with 210 scams descriptions. The clusters with the least number of scam
cases are clusters two and five (n < 5). The 5-cluster solution shows a negative distribution and some
clear changes in scam memberships. Scam cluster two has become the only cluster with the least
number of scam cases (n < 5) and the modal cluster is still cluster one which contains up to 210 scam
cases and the range of this cluster solution is 205. The 4-cluster solution reveals a very strong
negative trend, similar to that seen throughout the other cluster groupings. The scam cluster with
the least number of scam cases is cluster number four (n = 10), the mode is scam cluster one (n =
210) and the range has declined to 200. The results for the 3-cluster solution are similar to those
found in the 4-cluster solution. A strong negative trend is evident and the cluster with the least
number of scam cases is cluster number three with approximately 30 scam cases, the mode is cluster
number one which remains stable at 220 cases and the range has reduced again from 200 to 190.
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Table 15: Summary Table of Cluster Solutions for the Between Groups Linkage Jaccard Coefficient HCA
Model
Table 15 displays a summary of the results of this model. After revising the cluster ranges,
maximums and minimums, it is concluded that none of the models produced with the between
groups linkage method and the Jaccard coefficient distance measure are useful in determining
homogeneous groupings of scam memberships. All models from the twelve cluster model to the
three cluster model contain a cluster which is made up of in excess of 150 scam cases and another
cluster or multiple clusters with less than 5 scam cases in each. The ranges for each cluster solution
are also large and for this reason, the between groups linkage, Jaccard coefficient hierarchical
clustering method does not satisfactorily partition scam descriptions into homogeneous groups.
4.3.3 HCA: Within Groups Linkage – Jaccard Coefficient
Bar charts of the selected group number membership frequencies for the within groups linkage
Jaccard coefficient hierarchical cluster model appear in Figure 15 and the dendrogram for this model
can be seen in Figure 24. The 12-cluster solution displays a uniform distribution. Cluster number
twelve contains the least number of scam cases (n = 10) followed by clusters three, eight, and nine
(n = 13). The mode of the distribution is cluster number 7 containing 50 scams, followed by cluster
two which contains 40 scam descriptions. The range of scam descriptions across clusters in this
twelve cluster solution is 40. The 11-cluster solution displays a negative trend that is becoming more
homogeneous with uniformity emerging after the mode towards the tail. Cluster eleven contains the
fewest number of scam cases (n = 10) and clusters seven and nine follow with 12 scam descriptions
per cluster. The modal cluster is no longer cluster seven as with the twelve cluster solution but is
now cluster three with 65 scam cases. The range of this distribution is 55, fifteen more than the 12-
cluster solution. The 10-cluster solution displays a similarly shaped distribution to that of the 11-
cluster solution. Three clusters are equal in minimum frequency of scam cases which is 10 and the
modal cluster is cluster three with 65 scam cases. Clusters one and two contain equal frequencies (n
= 40) as do clusters five and seven (n = 25). The range remains unchanged (n = 55) to that of the 11-
cluster solution.
The 9-cluster solution shows little change in distribution from that of the 10-cluster solution. The
clusters containing the minimum number of scam cases are clusters six and nine with 12 scam cases.
The mode of the distribution is 65 and this occurs in cluster three. The stability of cluster three is
evident throughout the results thus far since cluster three has remained the mode for each cluster
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solution; nine, ten, and eleven. The range has not changed from the previous two cluster solutions (n
= 55). The 8-cluster solution displays a negative trend however, there appears to be some evening
out of scam cluster memberships suggesting an increase in homogeneity. The scam cluster with the
least number of scam cases is cluster number eight containing 10 scam cases. The modal cluster is
cluster number three with 75 scam descriptions, this is followed by cluster two with 73 cases and
cluster one with 40 cases while the range is 63. Clusters five and six contain the same number of
scam description cases (n = 25) as do clusters four and seven (n = 20). In the 7-cluster solution, a
uniform distribution is emerging. Scam cluster seven contains the least number of scam cases (n =
13) and cluster two has greatest frequency with 130 scam memberships. The range has now
increased to 117. Scam clusters four and five each contain 25 scam cases and cluster six has 20 while
cluster three contains 18. Cluster one is the second largest cluster with 35 scam cases.
The 6-cluster solution shows a more negative trend than the 7-cluster solution. The cluster with the
least number of scam cases is cluster six (n = 13) and cluster two is again the modal cluster with a
total number of 130 scam cases. Clusters four and five are equal (n = 25) and the range of this cluster
solution is the same as that of the seven cluster solution (n = 117). The5-cluster solution displays a
strong negative distribution. Scam cluster five contains the least number of scam memberships (n =
13) and is followed by clusters three and four (n = 25). Cluster two contains the second highest scam
memberships with 45 cases and the mode, which is cluster one contains 170 scam cases. The range
of this cluster solution is 157 which is a 40 scam increase from both the 6 and 7-cluster models. In
the 4-cluster solution the cluster with the least number of scam cases is cluster three (n = 25)
followed by cluster four (n = 30) and then cluster two (n = 45). Cluster one contains the most
number of scam cases (n = 170) which is the same as the previous five cluster solution and the range
for this model is 145. The final hierarchical model using the within groups linkage method and the
Jaccard distance coefficient is the 3-group cluster solution. The first cluster contains the highest
frequency which is close to 200 scam cases (n = 195) while clusters two and three are relatively
equal in their scam memberships with 40 and 35 scam cases respectively. The mode of this scam
cluster distribution is 160 which is a 15 scam case increase from the previous four cluster model and
120 scam cases greater than the first 12-cluster model.
The cluster solutions for the within groups linkage Jaccard coefficient model appear in Table 16 the
most promising models are those with eight and nine cluster solutions. This is because these cluster
solution show evidence of homogeneity as the scam cluster memberships start to even out and
these solutions are those which contain the fewest number of scam clusters with the least number
of scam cases in each cluster. Those solutions from cluster number seven down to cluster number 3
do not provide a useful model which offers distinction between scam descriptions. This is because of
the sheer size of cluster groups which can be recognized by comparing the modes of the ten models.
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Table 16: Summary Table of Cluster Solutions for the Within Groups Linkage Jaccard Coefficient HCA Model
4.3.4 HCA: Nearest Neighbour – Jaccard Coefficient
Bar charts of the selected group number membership frequencies for the nearest neighbour Jaccard
coefficient hierarchical cluster model appear in Figure 16 and the dendrogram for this model can be
seen in Figure 24. A quick inspection reveals that in six of the cluster solutions; twelve, eleven, ten,
nine, eight, and seven, there are two obvious clusters; cluster numbers one and seven for cluster
models ten through twelve, cluster numbers one and six for cluster models eight through nine, and
lastly cluster numbers one and five for the seven cluster solution. After this cluster solution, for all of
the decreasing sequential cluster solutions six through to three, only one cluster is apparent. For all
cluster solutions, cluster one contains the most number of scam cases and this hovers between 260
and 270 throughout each cluster solution.
After revising the cluster results presented in Table 17 it is concluded that none of the models
produced with the nearest neighbour linkage method and the Jaccard coefficient distance measure
are useful in determining homogeneous groups of scam memberships. All models from the twelve
cluster model to the three cluster model contain a cluster which is made up of over 250 scam cases
and either no other clusters or one other cluster containing less than 10 cases. The ranges for each
cluster solution are also large and for this reason, the nearest neighbour linkage with Jaccard
coefficient hierarchical clustering method does not satisfactorily partition scam descriptions into
homogeneous groups.
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Table 17: Summary Table of Cluster Solutions for the Nearest neighbour Jaccard Coefficient HCA Model
4.3.5 HCA: Furthest Neighbour – Simple Matching Coefficient
Bar charts of the selected group number membership frequencies for the furthest neighbour Simple
Matching coefficient hierarchical cluster model appear in Figure 17 and the dendrogram for this
model can be seen in Figure 25. The 12-cluster solution displays a negative distribution. Cluster
eleven contains the least number of scam cases (n < 5) and cluster one contains the most (n = 105),
the range of this distribution is 100. An 11-cluster solution maintains the negative distribution, the
minimum cluster is cluster number ten (n < 5) and the maximum cluster is still cluster number one (n
= 105), this cluster solution also has a range of 100. A 10-cluster solution has the same negative
distribution as that of the 11 and 12-cluster models. The cluster with the least number of scam cases
is cluster number nine (n < 5) and the maximum is again cluster number one (n = 105). The same
range of 100 applies here for the 10-cluster solution as it did for the 11 and 12-cluster solutions.
Evening among cluster frequencies is apparent for the 9-cluster solution and homogeneity among
groups is emerging. The cluster with the least number of scam cases is cluster number nine (n < 5)
and the cluster with the greatest scam case frequency is cluster number one (n = 105). Clusters
three, four, five, and seven are relatively equal with 30 cases in each cluster. The 8-cluster solution
shows a negative distribution with a minimum cluster frequency of less than 5 for cluster eight and a
maximum cluster frequency of 130 for cluster number one. The range of this distribution is 125 and
clusters three, four, and five contain relatively equal cluster frequencies (n = 25). For the 7-cluster
solution homogeneity is lost and a strong negative distribution emerges. Cluster number seven
contains the least number of scam cases while cluster number one is the modal cluster containing
130 cases. The range of this distribution is similar to that of the eight cluster solution (n = 125).
The 6-cluster solution is negatively distributed with a minimum cluster frequency of less than 5 cases
for cluster number six and a maximum cluster frequency of 130 cases for cluster number one, the
range is 125. A 5-cluster solution continues similarly to the previous model with an strong negative
trend. The cluster with the least number of scam description cases is cluster number five (n < 5) and
the cluster with the most number of scam descriptive cases is cluster number one (n = 148). The
range for this cluster solution is 143 scam cases. The 4-cluster solution closely resembles the result
of the five cluster solution. It displays a strong negative distribution, cluster four contains the least
number of scam cases (n < 5) and the first cluster contains the most number of scam cases (n = 148).
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The range of this distribution is the same as the 5-cluster solution (n = 143). Lastly, the 3-cluster
solution is negatively distributed, the cluster with the least number of scam cases is cluster number
three (n < 5). Cluster two contains 100 scam cases and cluster one contains 175 scam cases. The
range of this final distribution for the furthest neighbour method and Simple Matching coefficient is
170.
Table 18 below summarises the cluster results, it is concluded that none of the models produced
with the furthest neighbour linkage method and the Simple Matching coefficient distance measure
are useful in determining homogeneous groups of scam memberships. All models from the twelve
cluster model to the three cluster model contain a cluster which is made up of in excess of 100 scam
cases and a minimum cluster with less than 5 scam cases. The ranges for each cluster solution are
also large and for this reason, the furthest neighbour linkage, Simple Matching coefficient
hierarchical clustering method does not satisfactorily partition scam descriptions into homogeneous
groups.
Table 18: Summary Table of Cluster Solutions for the Furthest Neighbour Simple Matching Coefficient HCA
Model
4.3.6 HCA: Between Groups Linkage – Simple Matching Coefficient
Bar charts of the selected group number membership frequencies for the between groups linkage
Simple Matching coefficient hierarchical cluster model appear in Figure 18 and the dendrogram for
this model can be seen in Figure 26. The dendrogram displays decisive looking groups but the bar
charts of cluster memberships display more useful information. A brief inspection of the bar charts
reveals one cluster which contains almost all of the scam cases. In the 7-cluster solution, all of the
277 scam cases are lumped into one single cluster. This is evidence that the between groups linkage
method and the Simple Matching coefficient cannot be used to partition scam description static
features homogeneously across clusters and this is supported by the comparison of cluster solutions
appearing in Table 19, therefore, this method cannot be used to satisfy the three research
questions.
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Table 19: Summary Table of Cluster Solutions for the Between Groups Linkage Simple Matching Coefficient
HCA Model
4.3.7 HCA: Within Groups Linkage – Simple Matching Coefficient
Bar charts of the selected group number membership frequencies for the within groups linkage
Simple Matching coefficient hierarchical cluster model appear in Figure 18 and the dendrogram for
this model can be seen in Figure 27. Cluster 12-cluster solution displays a negative distribution, the
cluster with the minimum number of scam cases is cluster number eight and it contains less than 5
scams. Cluster number two has the highest frequency (n = 102) and the range of this distribution is
97. The 11-cluster solution is similar to that of the twelve cluster solution. It has an almost identical
distribution, the cluster with the least number of scam cases is cluster number seven (n < 5) and the
cluster with the greatest number of scam cases is cluster number two (n = 120), the range of this
distribution has increased to 115 from the twelve cluster solution. A 10-cluster solution reveals a
similar negative trend to that of the eleven and twelve cluster solutions. The cluster with the least
number of scam cases is still cluster number seven (n < 5) and the cluster with the most number of
scam cases is cluster number two which remains stable with 120 scam case memberships. The range
of this distribution is 115.
The 9-cluster solution remains almost unchanged from the 10-cluster solution since the distribution
is still negatively skewed. The cluster with the least number of scam cases is cluster number seven (n
< 5) and the cluster with the greatest scam case frequency is cluster number two which has grown
from 120 to 135 scam cases. The range of this distribution has increased to 130 scam cases. The 8-
cluster solution is negatively skewed, it contains a mode at cluster number two (n = 148) and
minimum cluster at cluster number six (n < 5). The range of the eight cluster distribution is 143 scam
cases. The 7-cluster solution displays a negative distribution, cluster two is the modal cluster (n =
152) and cluster number six is still the cluster with the minimum number of scam case memberships
(n < 5). The range of the 7-cluster distribution is 147.
The 6-cluster solution contains a modal cluster at cluster number two (n = 152) and a minimum
cluster at cluster number six (n < 5). Cluster number one contains 70 scam cases, cluster number
three and cluster number four are relatively equal in scam cases memberships (n = 18) and the final
cluster, cluster six contains 25 scam memberships. The range of this six cluster solution is the same
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as the range for the seven cluster solution (n = 147). For the 5-cluster solution, cluster number one
still has a frequency of 70, cluster number two is still the modal cluster (n = 152), cluster number
three and five contain 30 scam cases, and cluster number four is the cluster with the least number of
scam cases (n < 5). For the 4-cluster solution, cluster number one contains 70 cases, cluster number
two has 152 cases, and cluster numbers three and four are relatively equal in scam case frequencies
with 30 scam cases each. The final cluster solution is the 3-cluster solution. The mode of this
distribution is cluster number two and it contains 175 cases. Cluster number one still contains 70
cases and cluster number three is made up of 30 scam descriptions.
For each cluster model presented, a summary of the results appears in Table 20 there is one cluster
which continually contains more than 100 scam cases. Due to this and the large ranges it has been
concluded that this hierarchical cluster model is not suitable in determining homogeneous scam
partitions using scam static features. This is evidence that the within groups linkage method and the
Simple Matching coefficient cannot be used to partition scam description static features
homogeneously across clusters and as with the between groups linkage model, this method cannot
be used to satisfy the three research questions.
Table 20: Summary Table of Cluster Solutions for the Within Groups Linkage Simple Matching Coefficient
HCA Model
4.3.8 HCA: Nearest Neighbour – Simple Matching Coefficient
Bar charts of the selected group number membership frequencies for the within groups linkage
Simple Matching coefficient hierarchical cluster model appear in Figure 18 and the dendrogram for
this model can be seen in Figure 28.  Little investigation needs to be done to come to the conclusion
that this model is unsuited to the homogeneous partitioning of scam cases. For every cluster
solution only one cluster emerges and this cluster contains all of the 277 scam cases. Therefore, the
nearest neighbour method and the Simple Matching coefficient cannot be used to partition scam
description static features homogeneously across clusters and this method cannot be used to satisfy
the three research questions, a comparison of the cluster results appears in Table 21.
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Table 21: Summary Table of Cluster Solutions for the Nearest Neighbour Simple Matching Coefficient HCA
Model
4.3.9 HCA Summary
The Jaccard distance coefficient produced some interesting results while the Simple Matching
distance coefficient method did not partition adequately. A summary of these results appears below
in Table 22. Using the furthest neighbour method, the Jaccard coefficient found four possible
solutions and these were the six, seven, eight, and nine cluster models. The within groups method
using the Jaccard coefficient also produced some interesting results with the eight and nine cluster
solution. The purpose of the analysis was to identify homogeneous clusters of scam cases derived
from scam static features. The hierarchical cluster model was determined to be suitable if it
contained the fewest clusters with the least number of scam cases in each cluster. The above models
have been selected for further analysis by discriminant function analysis to determine which model
will best assist in predicting the accuracy of scam cluster memberships as well as identify those static
features that are significant to the model.
Table 22: Summary of Cluster Solutions for Each HCA Method and Measure
It can be concluded by these results that the Simple Matching binary distance measure is not
suitable for identifying homogeneous scam clusters inferred from derived scam static features. It can
also be concluded that both the between groups and nearest neighbour linkage methods are
unsuited to this type of data for clustering. The Jaccard binary distance measure and the furthest
neighbour and within groups methods are the best models for determining homogeneous groups
among scam cases derived from scam static features.
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4.4 Model Verification
A discriminant function analysis is useful in developing rules which assign cases to clusters and
because of this it has been selected to analyse the cluster memberships assigned to the scams
during the hierarchical clustering analysis phase of this research. By using a discriminant function
analysis, the predicted cluster memberships for each selected hierarchical clustering solution will be
tested and conclusions drawn over the suitability of each model. The hierarchical cluster models
selected for this procedure are the furthest neighbour method using the Jaccard distance coefficient
for each of the six, seven, eight, and nine cluster solutions, as well as the within groups linkage
method also using the Jaccard distance measure for an eight and nine cluster solution, where the
cluster memberships formed due to the hierarchical clustering analyses are the dependent variables
and the scam static features are the independent variables.
The goal of the discriminant function analysis is to assess the reliability of each selected hierarchical
model. A reliable model is defined as a model in which the (n-1) discriminant functions combined
account for at least 95% of variability within the data. A model which accounts for at least 95% of
variability would then be concluded to be at least 95% accurate. Another goal of the discriminant
function analysis is to identify which scam static features are significant to predicting scam cluster
membership.
4.4.1 DFA: Furthest Neighbour – Jaccard Coefficient 9 Cluster Model
To predict the group memberships of the 9 clusters found in the furthest neighbour, Jaccard model,
82 predictor variables were used. First, the equality of group means was tested with the
experimental hypothesis that group means are not equal. Of the 82 static features, 72 tested
significant; these variables do not share mean equivalence across groups. There were nine variables
that did not satisfy the experimental hypothesis and these were; good luck (F = 1.043, p = 0.404),
insight (F = 1.476, p = 0.166), government agency (F = 1.269, p = 0.260), refund available (F = 0.997, p
= 0.439), no credit check required (F = 0.8, p = 0.603), disguised as invoice (F = 1.912, p = 0.058),
verifiable street address (F = 0.547, p = 0.821), further contact by email or phone (F = 1.179, p =
0.312) and polite broken English (F = 1.820, p = 0.073), a full table of results appears in Table 44
found in the Appendix. The variation within the model is not accounted for by any of these variables.
One static feature was identified as failing the tolerance testing and this was the ‘overpayment’
variable.
From the Predicted Results table in Table 51 in the Appendix, the scam case number is given along
with the cluster membership that was assigned to each scam case through the hierarchical clustering
analysis along with its first and second predicted group memberships from the discriminant function
analysis. From these results it can be seen that eight scams were not predicted accurately by the
hierarchical clustering analysis. Scam case number 70 which is a scam recorded from the OFT and is
titled Fake Clairvoyant Scam was clustered into cluster one by the hierarchical clustering analysis but
its initial predicted group membership was scam cluster 3. The second cluster that this scam was
predicted to most likely fit into was cluster number 4. Scam number 72 which was a Get Rich Quick
Scam also sourced from the OFT was clustered into cluster 9 by the hierarchical clustering method
but was predicted to belong to cluster 5 by the discriminant model. The alternative cluster which is
predicted to most likely suit this scam is cluster 9; this is also the hierarchically clustered solution.
Also assigned membership to its hierarchically clustered group during the second stage of prediction
is the Psychic and Clairvoyant Mailing Scam (96), also by the OFT. This scam was assigned to cluster 1
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during the hierarchical clustering procedure but was predicted to belong to cluster 3 by the
discriminant function procedure.
The ACCC’s Charity Scam (191) was assigned to cluster number 9 during the hierarchical clustering
stage but was predicted to belong to cluster 2 by the discriminant function procedure. During the
second stage of prediction however, this scam was allocated back to the 9th cluster. Multilevel
Marketing (202) from the United States Postal Inspectors Service (USPIS) was clustered into scam
genre 9 by the hierarchical clustering procedure but was predicted to belong to the 5th cluster during
the discriminant analysis, and was reassigned back to the 9th cluster during the second stage of
prediction. Unclaimed Tax Refund Scam (212) also from the USPIS was assigned to cluster 3 by the
hierarchical clustering method but was predicted to belong to cluster 4, it was then reassigned back
to cluster 3 during the second phase of predictions. Illegal Sweepstakes Information (220) by the
USPIS was clustered into scam cluster 4 originally while it was predicted that it belonged to cluster 3,
it was then reassigned to cluster 4 during the second predictive phase. Scam number 227 is Home
Improvement and Repair Fraud sourced from the USPIS. It was clustered into scam cluster 4 by the
hierarchical clustering procedure and predicted to belong to cluster 3 by the discriminant model. It
was also reassigned to its original cluster during the second phase of prediction.
The Wilks’ Lambda results in Table 50 in the Appendix confirm that each of the discriminant
functions are significant to the model, all have p=values less than 0.05 (p = 0.00) and large Chi-
square values. From the Eigenvalues table, Table 49 in the Appendix, it can be seen that the first
function accounts for 32.8% of the total variation within the clustering of scam cases (E = 14.997).
The first 6 functions capture 92.4% (E = 2.353) of the variation and by extending this to the 7th
function, 96.3% (E = 1.788) of the variation in scam genre membership is accounted for.
4.4.2 DFA: Furthest Neighbour – Jaccard Coefficient 8 Cluster Model
To predict the group memberships of the 8 clusters found in the 8 cluster solution of the furthest
neighbour, Jaccard model, the 82 predictor variables were used, the results of which appear in the
Appendix. The equality of group means was tested with the experimental hypothesis that group
means are not equal. Of the 82 static features, 68 tested significant; these variables do not share
mean equivalence across groups. There were 13 variables that did not satisfy the experimental
hypothesis and these were; fax (F = 1.829, p = 0.082), human interaction (F = 1.367, p = 0.219), good
luck (F = 1.064, p = 0.387), insight (F = 1.693, p = 0.111), love affection or connection (F = 1.647, p =
0.122), government agency (F = 1.137, p = 0.34), refund available (F = 0.63, p = 0.731), no credit
check required (F = 0.601, p = 0.755), from corporate of government official (F = 1.749, p = 0.098),
send onto others (F = 1.597, p = 0.136), verifiable street address (F = 0.627, p = 0.733), further
contact by email or phone (F = 1.04, p = 0.403), and polite broken English (F = 0.671, p = 0.696), a full
table of results appears in Table 52 in the Appendix. The variation within the model is not accounted
for by any of these variables. One static feature was identified as failing the tolerance testing and
this was the ‘overpayment’ variable.
From the predicted group membership results in Table 56 in the Appendix, it can be seen that 7
scams were not predicted accurately by the hierarchical clustering analysis. Scam case number 70
which is a scam recorded from the OFT and is titled Fake Clairvoyant Scam was clustered into cluster
1 by the hierarchical clustering analysis but it’s first predicted group membership was scam cluster 3.
The second cluster that this scam was predicted to most likely fit into was cluster number 2. Scam
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number 72 which was a Get Rich Quick Scam also sourced from the OFT was clustered into group 8
by the hierarchical clustering method but was predicted to belong to group 4 by the discriminant
model. The alternative cluster which is predicted to most likely suit this scam is cluster 8 which is the
hierarchically clustered solution. Scam number 96, the Psychic and Clairvoyant Mailing Scam also by
the OFT scam was assigned to cluster 1 during the hierarchical clustering procedure but was
predicted to belong to cluster 3 by the discriminant function procedure. During the second stage of
prediction however, this scam was reassigned to its original cluster, cluster 1.
Multilevel Marketing (202) from the USPIS was clustered into scam genre 8 by the hierarchical
clustering procedure but was predicted to belong to the 4th cluster during the discriminant analysis,
and was reassigned back to the 8th cluster during the second stage of prediction. Unclaimed Tax
Refund Scam (212) also from the USPIS was assigned to cluster 3 by the hierarchical clustering
method but predicted to belong to cluster 2; it then assigned to cluster 4 during the second phase of
predictions. Scam number 227 is Home Improvement and Repair Fraud sourced from the USPIS. It
was clustered into scam genre 2 by the hierarchical clustering procedure and predicted to belong to
scam genre 3 by the discriminant model. It was reassigned to its original cluster during the second
phase of prediction.  The final scam that was not clustered by the hierarchical clustering procedure
as the predictive model would suggest is the Cold Calling Scam from FIDO. It was clustered into scam
genre 3 by the hierarchical clustering approach but it was predicted to belong to cluster 8 by the
discriminant function analysis, however, its second group prediction reassigned Cold Calling back to
its original cluster, cluster 3.
The Wilks’ Lambda results in Table 55 found in the Appendix, confirm that each of the discriminant
functions are significant to the model, have p=values less than 0.05 (p = 0.00) and large Chi-square
values. From the Eigenvalues table, Table 54 in the Appendix, it can be seen that the first function
accounts for 36.5% of the total variation within the clustering of scam (E = 14.933). The first 6
functions capture 95.7% (E = 1.805) of the variation.
4.4.3 DFA: Furthest Neighbour – Jaccard Coefficient 7 Cluster Model
To predict the group membership of the 7 clusters found in the 7 cluster solution of the furthest
neighbour, Jaccard model, 82 predictor variables were used. The equality of group means was tested
with the experimental hypothesis that group means are not equal. Of the 82 static features, 68
tested significant; these variables do not share mean equivalence across groups. There were 13
variables that did not satisfy the experimental hypothesis and these were; human interaction (F =
1.601, p = 0.147), good luck (F = 1.234, p = 0.289), insight (F = 1.959, p = 0.072), love affection or
connection (F = 1.928, p = 0.076), government agency (F = 0.883, p = 0.508), refund available (F =
0.557, p = 0.764), no credit check required (F = 0.649, p = 0.691), from corporate or government
official (F = 2.048, p = 0.06), send onto others (F = 0.649, p = 0.691), disguised as invoice (F = 1.65, p
= 0.134), verifiable street address (F = 0.469, p = 0.134), further contact by email or phone (F =
1.218, p = 0.297), and polite broken English (F = 0.732, p = 0.624), a full table of results appears in
Table 57 in the Appendix. The variation within the model is not accounted for by any of these
variables. One static feature was identified as failing the tolerance testing and this was the
‘overpayment’ variable.
The scam case number is given along with the cluster membership that was assigned to it through
the hierarchical clustering analysis and its first and second predicted group membership from the
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discriminant function analysis is seen in Table 61 in the Appendix. From these results it can be seen
that 7 scams were not predicted accurately by the hierarchical clustering analysis. Scam case number
46 which is a scam recorded from IC3 and is titled Debt Elimination Scam was clustered into cluster 5
by the hierarchical clustering analysis but it’s first predicted group membership was scam cluster 2.
The second cluster most that this scam was predicted to most likely fit into was cluster number 5.
Scam number 64 which was a Pyramid Scam sourced from the ABS was clustered into group 1 by the
hierarchical clustering method but was predicted to belong to group 7 by the discriminant model.
The alternative cluster which is predicted to most likely suit this scam is cluster 1 which is the
hierarchically clustered solution. Scam number 72, Get Rich Quick by the OFT was assigned to cluster
7 during the hierarchical clustering procedure but was predicted to belong to cluster 3 from the
discriminant function procedure. During the second stage of prediction however, this scam was
assigned to its original cluster, 7.
Multilevel Marketing (202) from the USPIS was clustered into scam genre 7 by the hierarchical
clustering procedure but was predicted to belong to the 3rd cluster during the discriminant analysis,
and was reassigned to the 7th cluster during the second stage of prediction. Scam number 220, Illegal
Sweepstakes Information from the USPIS was allocated within scam cluster 1 during the hierarchical
clustering procedure and was assigned to scam cluster 2 by the discriminant function analysis. The
second prediction for this case is its original cluster group, 1. Scam number 227 is Home
Improvement and Repair Fraud sourced from the USPIS. It was clustered into scam genre 2 by the
hierarchical clustering procedure and predicted to belong to scam genre 1 by the discriminant
model. It was reassigned back to its original cluster during the second phase of prediction. The final
scam that was not clustered as the predictive model would suggest is the Cold Calling Scam from
FIDO (261). It was clustered into scam genre 1 by the hierarchical clustering approach but it was
predicted to belong to cluster 7 by the discriminant function analysis. Its second group prediction
however was the original cluster, cluster 1.
The Wilks’ Lambda results in Table 60 in the Appendix confirm that each discriminant function is
significant to the model, all have p-values are less than 0.05 (p = 0.00) with large Chi-square values.
From the Eigenvalues table, Table 62 in the Appendix, it can be seen that the first function accounts
for 31.6% of the total variation within the clustering of scam cases (E = 10.838). The first 5 functions
capture 94.7% (E = 1.997) of the variation.
4.4.4 DFA: Furthest Neighbour – Jaccard Coefficient 6 Cluster Model
A discriminant function analysis of the 6 solution hierarchical clustering results reveals 14 static
features that are not significant to the predictive model. These variables do not have a significant
influence on the clustering results. These static features are human interaction (F = 1.916, p = 0.092),
good luck (F = 1.487, p = 0.194), property (F = 1.773, p = 0.119), government approved (F = 1.440, p =
0.21), love affection or connection (F = 2.181, p = 0.057), government agency (F = 0.981, p = 0.43),
refund available ( F = 0.538, p = 0.747), share tips (F = 2.168, p = 0.058), no credit check required (F =
0.622, p = 0.683), send onto others (F = 2.252, p = 0.05), disguised as an invoice (F = 1.987, p =
0.081), verifiable street address (F = 0.565, p = 0.727), further contact by email or phone (F = 1.455,
p = 0.205), and polite broken English (F = 0.721, p = 0.608) a full table of results appears in Table 62
in the Appendix. One final feature was removed from the model as with the three previous
discriminant procedures and that is the ‘overpayment’ variable.
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Table 66 in the Appendix details the results of the predicted groups memberships, only 6 scams were
clustered differently to the predicted cluster memberships and all of these were replaced back into
their original cluster group during the second phase of predictions. Debt Elimination from IC3 was
scam number 46 and this case was originally placed into cluster number 5. The predicted cluster for
this case is cluster 2 however. The Charity Scam (191) from the ACCC was the next case to be
clustered differently. This case was originally clustered into cluster number 3 during the hierarchical
clustering analysis while its predicted cluster membership is cluster number 2. Illegal Sweepstakes
Information (220) from USPIS is the third case to be clustered differently. This case was placed into
cluster 1 by the hierarchical procedure and was predicted to belong to cluster 2 by the discriminant
function analysis. Scam number 227 is from the USPIS and its title is Home Improvement and Repair
Fraud. It was originally placed into cluster 2 while its predicted cluster is cluster number 1.
Scamsmart’s Ponzi Scam (250) was placed into cluster 3 by the hierarchical clustering analysis and
the discriminant function analysis predicted it to belong to cluster 1. Finally, FIDO’s Cold Calling Scam
(261) was placed into cluster 1 while it is predicted to belong to cluster 3.
The Wilks’ Lambda results in Table 65 in the Appendix confirm that each of discriminant functions
are significant, all have p-values less than 0.05 (p = 0.00) and large Chi-square values. From the
Eigenvalues table, Table 64 in the Appendix, it can be seen that the first function accounts for 41.2%
of the total variation within the clustering of scam cases. A four-function solution accounts for 92.9%
of variation within the model.
4.4.5 DFA: Within Groups Linkage – Jaccard Coefficient 9 Cluster Model
A discriminant function analysis on the 9 solution hierarchical clustering result using within groups
linkage and the Jaccard Coefficient reveals 20 static features that are not significant to the predictive
model. These variables do not have a significant influence on the clustering results. These static
features are text (F = 1.946, p = 0.063), fax (F = 0.969, p = 0.455), human interaction (F = 1.882, p =
0.073), holiday (F = 1.435, p = 0.191), financial services (F = 0.625, p = 0.735), good luck (F = 1.274, p
= 0.263), property (F = 0.769, p = 0.614), services (F = 1.704, p = 0.108), insight (F = 1.841, p = 0.08),
legal (F = 1.639, p = 0.125), government approved (F = 1.897, p = 0.07), love affection or connection
(F = 0.791, p = 0.595), government agency (F = 1.956, p = 0.061), refund available (F = 0.459, p =
0.864), no credit check required (F = 1.342, p = 0.231), send onto others (F = 1.639, p = 0.124),
verifiable street address (F = 0.598, p = 0.758), testimonials (F = 1.914, p = 0.068), reward greater
than upfront cost (F = 1.451, p = 0.185), and polite broken English (F = 1.338, p = 0.233), a full table
of results appears in Table 67 in the Appendix. One final feature was removed from the model as
with 3 pervious discriminant procedures and that is ‘overpayment’.
Table 71 in the Appendix details the predicted group memberships. Using this sample, 6 scams were
clustered differently to the predicted cluster memberships. The first scam to have a different cluster
prediction to its assigned cluster number is the Weight Loss Scam (12) from Scamwatch. It was
placed into cluster number 6 from the hierarchical cluster analysis and its predicted cluster is cluster
2. The second prediction for cluster membership for this case is its original cluster solution 3. Scam
66, Credit or Bank Card Fraud from the ABS was originally placed into cluster 4, its predicted cluster
is cluster 1 and its second predicted cluster is its original placement, 4. Scam number 112, Rolling Lab
Scams from the FBI was grouped into cluster 6 by the hierarchical clustering procedure. Its predicted
cluster membership was for cluster 1 while its second predicted membership is cluster 3. Romance
Scams from ‘Looks too good to be true’ (137) was placed into cluster 7 but predicted to belong to
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cluster 3. This scam had a second cluster prediction that mirrored the hierarchical clustering results.
Spam Scam (179) from the ACCC was grouped into cluster 7 while it was predicted to belong to
cluster 3. The second predicted cluster solution for this scam was cluster number 4. Solicitations
Disguised as Invoices (217) from USPIS was placed in cluster 8 and was predicted to belong to cluster
3. The second cluster that this scam was predicted to belong to was cluster 2.
The Wilks’ Lambda results in Table 70 in the Appendix confirm that each of discriminant functions
are significant, all have p-values less than 0.05 (p = 0.00) and large Chi-square values. From the
Eigenvalues table in Table 69 in the Appendix, it can be seen that the first function accounts for
23.1% of the total variation within the clustering of scam cases (E = 13.899). The 7 function solution
accounts for 95.4% (E = 2.789) of variation.
4.4.6 DFA: Within Groups Linkage – Jaccard Coefficient 8 Cluster Model
A discriminant function analysis on the 8 cluster hierarchical clustering result using within groups
linkage and the Jaccard coefficient reveals 20 static features that are not significant to the predictive
model. These variables do not have a significant influence on the clustering results. These static
features are text (F = 1.695, p = 0.099), fax (F = 1.099m p = 0.364), human interaction (F = 1.741, p =
0.089), holiday (F = 1.578, p = 0.131), financial services (F = 0.878, p = 0.536), good luck (F = 1.406, p
= 0.24), property (F = 0.670, p = 0.718), services (F = 1.517, p = 0.151), insight (F = 1.63, p = 0.116),
legal (F = 1.924, p = 0.057), government approved (F = 1.661, p = 0.108), love affection or connection
(F = 0.832, p = 0.575), government agency (F = 1.843, p = 0.069), disguised as an invoice (F = 1.798, p
= 0.078), verifiable street address (F = 0.521, p = 0.84), reward greater than upfront cost (F = 1.287, p
= 0.25), and polite broken English (F = 1.238, p = 0.277) a full table of statistics appears in Table 72 in
the Appendix. One final feature was removed from the model and that is the ‘overpayment’
variable.
Tale 73 in the Appendix displays the predicted membership results. Using this sample, only 5 scams
were clustered differently to the predicted cluster memberships. The first scam to have a different
cluster prediction to its assigned cluster number is the Weight Loss Scam (12) from Scamwatch. It
was placed into cluster number 7 from the hierarchical cluster analysis and its predicted cluster is
cluster 2. The second prediction for cluster membership for this case is its original cluster solution 7.
Scam 66, Credit or Bank Card Fraud from the ABS was originally placed into cluster 4, its predicted
cluster is cluster 1 and its second predicted cluster is its original placement, 4. Scam 137, Romance
Scam from ‘Looks too good to be true’ was placed in cluster 8 while its predicted cluster is cluster 3.
This scam also had a second cluster prediction that mirrored the hierarchical clustering results. Spam
Scam (179) from the ACCC was grouped into cluster 8 while it was predicted to belong to cluster 3.
The second predicted cluster solution for this scam was cluster number 4. Solicitations Disguised as
Invoices (217) from USPIS was placed in cluster 9 and was predicted to belong to cluster 3. The
second cluster that this scam was predicted to belong to was cluster 2.
The Wilks’ Lambda results in Table 75 in the Appendix confirm that each of discriminant functions
are significant, all have p-values less than 0.05 (p = 0.00) and large Chi-square values. From the
Eigenvalues table in Table 74 in the Appendix, it can be seen that the first function accounts for
31.5% of the total variation within the clustering of scam cases (E = 7.465). The seven-function
solution accounts for 93% (E = 2.819) of variation.
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4.4.7 DFA:  Comparison Summary
The purpose of performing discriminant function analyses on the most promising results from the
hierarchical clustering procedures was to identify which hierarchical model best partitioned scam
cases into homogeneous groups. This was achieved by using the cluster membership results from six
suitable hierarchical procedures as the dependent variables in six individual discriminant analysis
procedures and the same static features used in the hierarchical procedure as the independent
variables in the discriminant function analysis. The goal of the hierarchical procedure was to find the
fewest clusters of scam cases containing the least number of scam cases per cluster. The goal of the
discriminant function analysis was to test the accuracy of the cluster models, seeking at least a 95%
level of accuracy. A secondary goal of the discriminant function analysis was to identify which static
features most impact the prediction of scam cluster memberships, comparative results of the
discriminant function analyses performed appear below in Table 23
Table 23: Summary Table of Cluster Model and its Level of Accuracy
Method Clusters Accuracy
Furthest
neighbour,
Jaccard
9 96.3
Furthest
neighbour,
Jaccard
8 95.7
Furthest
neighbour,
Jaccard
7 94.7
Furthest
neighbour.
Jaccard
6 92.9
Within
groups,
Jaccard
9 95.4
Within
groups,
Jaccard
8 93
The first discriminant function analysis performed was on the results from the nine cluster model of
the furthest neighbour, Jaccard coefficient hierarchical clustering procedure. This model accurately
predicted 96.3% of scam cluster memberships. The second discriminant procedure was performed
on the results from the eight cluster model of the furthest neighbour, Jaccard coefficient hierarchical
clustering procedure. This model accurately predicted 95.7% of scam cluster memberships. The third
discriminant procedure performed was on the 7 cluster solution of the furthest neighbour, Jaccard
coefficient hierarchical procedure. This model accurately predicted 94.7% of scam cluster
memberships. The fourth discriminant procedure was performed on the results of the six cluster
solution furthest neighbour, Jaccard coefficient hierarchical clustering analysis. This model
accurately predicted 92.9% of scam cluster memberships. The fifth discriminant function analysis
performed was on the results from the nine cluster model of the within groups linkage, Jaccard
coefficient hierarchical clustering procedure. This method accurately predicted 95.4% of scam
cluster memberships. The sixth and final discriminant function analysis was performed on the 8
cluster solution from the within groups linkage, Jaccard coefficient hierarchical clustering model.
This method accurately predicted 93% of scam cluster memberships.
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There are two models of interest which emerge from the hierarchical cluster results and are
confirmed by the discriminant function analysis and these are the 8-cluster furthest neighbour
Jaccard coefficient and the 7-cluster furthest neighbour Jaccard coefficient models. The 8-cluster
model from the furthest neighbour and Jaccard method is selected as preferable a model because it
contain one of the fewest number of clusters and less than 5% of variation in cluster placement
results (p = 95.7%).  The 7-cluster model from the same hierarchical method contains the fewest
clusters while the amount of variation in scam group placement is only slightly greater than 5%
(94.7%). This solution is of interest because if the error margin can be reduced to no more than 5%
then this model would offer the best solution since it would become the solution with the fewest
number of clusters with the least amount of acceptable variation. The seven cluster model was
therefore re-tested with all non-significant static features removed.
With the non-significant static features removed, the model 7-cluster contains 68 predictor
variables, all of which test significant to the model as can be seen in the Tests of Equality of Group
Means that appear in Table 77 with Insignificant Features Removed in the Appendix.
There are thirteen scam entries that were predicted to belong to a different cluster than that
assigned to them during the hierarchical clustering analysis; these results appear in Table 80 with
Insignificant Features Removed in the Appendix. All of these scams however, were reassigned to the
original cluster that they were placed within during the hierarchical procedure during the second
stage of cluster membership prediction. These were scam number 19, Free Offers on the Internet
from Scamwatch. This was predicted to belong to cluster 1 while it was placed into cluster 5 by the
hierarchical procedure. Scam number 45, Credit Card Fraud from the IC3, was predicted to belong to
cluster 1 while it was placed into cluster 5 by the hierarchical procedure. Scam number 46, Debt
Elimination by the IC3, was predicted to belong to cluster 2 while it was placed into cluster 5 by the
hierarchical procedure. Scam number 50, Identity Theft from the IC3, was predicted to belong to
cluster 3 while it was placed into cluster 5 by the hierarchical procedure. Scam number 63, Phishing
and Related Scams from the ABS, was predicted to belong to cluster 7 while it was placed into
cluster 1 by the hierarchical procedure. Scam number 72, Get Rich Quick Scams from the OFT, was
predicted to belong to cluster 3 while it was placed into cluster 7 by the hierarchical procedure.
Scam number 82, Advance Fee Vacation Fraud from the ERG, was predicted to belong to cluster 2
while it was placed into cluster 1 by the hierarchical procedure. Scam number 202, Multilevel
Marketing from the USPIS, was predicted to belong to cluster 3 while it was placed into cluster 7 by
the hierarchical procedure. Scam number 207, Advance Fee Loan Scam from the USPIS, was
predicted to belong to cluster 1 while it was placed into cluster 2 by the hierarchical procedure.
Scam number 212, Unclaimed Income Tax Refund from the USPIS, was predicted to belong to cluster
2 while it was placed into cluster 1 by the hierarchical procedure. Scam number 220, Illegal
Sweepstake Information from the USPIS, was predicted to belong to cluster 2 while it was placed
into cluster 1 by the hierarchical procedure. Scam number 227, Home Improvement and Repair
Fraud from the USPIS, was predicted to belong to cluster 1 while it was placed into cluster 2 by the
hierarchical procedure. Lastly, scam number 261, Cold Calling from FIDO, was predicted to belong to
cluster 7 while it was placed into cluster 1 by the hierarchical procedure.
Since all of the scams predicted to belong to a different group to that assigned to them during the
hierarchical clustering analysis were predicted to belong to their originally derived group during the
second phase of discriminant predictions, it is concluded that the seven-cluster model is suitable for
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homogeneous scam case clustering. The Wilks’ Lambda results in Table 79 with Insignificant Features
Removed and Table 78 with Insignificant Features Removed in the Appendix, further confirms this
conclusion with 95% of the variation within the model being accounted for by the first six functions
with all functions significant to the model (p = 0).
4.5 Summary
The purpose of the analyses performed here were to identify homogeneous subsets of scam cases.
This was achieved through the use of hierarchical clustering analysis and discriminant function
analysis. The aim of this research was to formulate clusters of scam cases derived from similarity
matching principles based upon the purposely derived static features of scam descriptions. It was
hypothesized that a smaller number of scam clusters could be found than the publicly acknowledged
38 which were recorded during the data collection phase. Hierarchical clustering was selected as the
optimal choice for clustering analysis because it was unknown how many scam clusters there would
be and the data was limited by its binary form. This method of clustering was also selected because
of its natural tendency to find homogeneous subsets within a data set. Therefore, another aim of
this research was to find the most reliable partitioning of scam cases which would allow for the
homogeneous clustering of scam cases across the fewest number of clusters.
There were eight hierarchical clustering procedures performed on the purposefully derived scam
static features. These included two binary distance methods for comparison and four linkage
methods suitable for binary data, also for comparison. The binary distance measures compared were
the Jaccard coefficient and the Simple Matching coefficient. The four linkage methods compared
were the furthest neighbour, within groups linkage, between groups linkage, and nearest neighbour
methods. The memberships of scam clusters were recorded for each analysis performed and
dendrograms and bar charts tabulating the frequencies within each cluster were created.
Conclusions were drawn from inspecting the dendrograms and bar charts from each round of
analysis.
Conclusions were drawn from the cluster frequency results for each hierarchical clustering
procedure. The key points reported upon were the clusters with the minimum and maximum
frequencies and the range and shape of each distribution. A primary contributing factor to the
conclusions drawn regarding the acceptability of a model or rejection of a model were due to the
range of frequency solutions and the shape of the distribution. If a distribution contained a single
cluster with 100 scam cases or greater, it was rejected and it was concluded that the model was
unsuited to the homogeneous partitioning of scam cases. This was because a cluster with 100+ scam
cases did not provide enough segmentation or discrepancy in scam cluster identification which
would cause difficulty in further analysis. Since one of the goals of this research is to identify
relatively homogeneous groups of scam cases, it is assumed that the ideal solution will be
representative of the sample and scam cases will be relatively evenly distributed amongst the final
number of identified scam clusters, thus removing all concern over limited or small cluster sample
sizes. The results found from this investigation are general to the sample tested and this sample
alone. Further scam gathering from a wider variety of sources is necessary to compile a data set
large enough and comprehensive enough to use the results to make generalization of the wider
population. This investigation is a pre-curser for such a study and as such is an investigation into the
idea that divisively derived scam static features can be used as a the basis of scam structure for the
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identification of like and dislike cases of scam type using hierarchical clustering analysis. All results
are pertinent to this sample only and should be interpreted with caution in the wider context.
The inspection of hierarchical clustering results concluded that the Jaccard distance coefficient was
most suitable for the homogeneous partitioning of scam cases. The Simple Matching distance
coefficient did not provide any suitable results for either linkage method tested. The nearest
neighbour and within groups linkage methods were the most appropriate linkage method for
partitioning scam cases into homogeneous subsets. The between groups and nearest neighbour
methods did not proved any suitable results across either distance measure. The hierarchical
clustering model that provided the most promising results was the furthest neighbour – Jaccard
coefficient model. This model provided four cluster groupings that were selected for further analysis.
These were the nine, eight, seven and six cluster solutions. The within groups – Jaccard coefficient
model provided two cluster groupings that were selected for further analysis and these were the
nine and eight cluster solutions.
Those hierarchical cluster models selected were further analysed by a discriminant function analysis.
The goal of the discriminant function analysis was to assess the reliability of each model. A reliable
model was defined as a model in which the (n-1) discriminant functions combined accounted for at
least 95% of variability within the data. A model which accounted for at least 95% of variability could
then be claimed to be at least 95% accurate. Another goal of the discriminant function analysis was
to identify which scam static features were significant to cluster membership prediction.
The cluster solutions found to be accurate at least 95% of the time and with the fewest number of
clusters were the 8-cluster and 7-cluster furthest neighbour, Jaccard coefficient models. With all
insignificant static features removed, the 7-cluster model was found to be accurate 95% of the time.
The number of static features significant to the accurate partitioning of scam cases into
homogeneous subsets was 68. The following chapter, Chapter 7 discusses these results in further
detail and delivers concluding remarks for each problem statement. The results from each of the 7-
cluster and 8-cluster model outlined above are discussed and the resultant scam genres identified
and labeled. The validation of the furthest neighbour, Jaccard coefficient hierarchical clustering
model for scam-based research carries implications for the usability of text-based publicly accessible
data in mixed methodological and quantitative analysis. These results also confirm the variability of
scam descriptions across jurisdictions and provide evidence for the necessity of the standardisation
of terminology.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
5.1 Discussion
The purpose of this research was to homogeneously group scam perpetrations into hierarchical
groups of scam genres using clustering and discriminant function analysis of derived static features.
Prenzler and Hays (2002) demonstrate that a hierarchy of fraud exists and it was inferred that a
hierarchy if scams also exists. Similar to the methods of Holt and Graves (2007), data was derived
from publicly available scam descriptions and through a bottom-up, grounded theoretical approach
involving the manual content analysis of scam descriptive texts, scam static features were derived.
Like Airoldi and Malin (2004) work on fraudulent intent detection in emails, hierarchical cluster
analysis was used to identify homogeneous groups of scams by partitioning scams into similar
clusters. The suitable cluster solutions were then tested for accuracy using discriminant function
analysis. The residual effect of clustering scams by their descriptions is the standardisation of scam
descriptions and identification of significant static features which can be used to confidently identify
the type of scam a scam is.
5.1.1 Resolving the Research Problems
The first research objective was to cluster scam descriptions by partitioning them into scam genres.
The research problem associated with this objective is the Homogeneous Grouping Problem which
aimed to determine the suitability of hierarchical cluster analysis for the homogeneous partitioning
of scam cases. The second research objective was to measure the effectiveness of using scam static
features for the partitioning of scam cases into scam genres. The research problem associated with
the second objective is the Static Feature Selection Problem which aimed to resolve the necessity of
scam static features in determining scam case partitioning and scam genre membership as well as
identify which static features most impact on scam case placement. The third research objective was
to find the clustering model which best reduces scam cases into the fewest number of clusters with
the least number of scam cases within each cluster which is accurate at least 95% of the time. The
research problem associated with the third objective is the Minimum Cluster and Least Membership
Problem.
5.1.2 Homogeneous Grouping Problem
To address the Homogeneous Grouping Problem, four linkage methods and two distance measures
were tested and the results compared. The hierarchical model found to best partition scam cases
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into homogeneous groups using the static features as independent variables was the furthest
neighbour, Jaccard coefficient model. Second to this was the within groups linkage, Jaccard
coefficient model. Each model relying on the Simple Matching coefficient was not useful in
partitioning scams as was the nearest neighbour and between groups linkage, Jaccard coefficient
models. The furthest neighbour, Jaccard coefficient model was able to partition scam cases into
homogeneous subsets while finding the least number of scam clusters with the fewest number of
scam cases in each cluster.
The results found here suggest that the proposed combination of method and measure is most
suited to explicit binary category membership data of the sample tested here.
5.1.3 Static Feature Selection Problem
Scam static features were derived from scam descriptive texts and these were used as independent
variables for the homogeneous clustering of scam cases. The Static Feature Selection Problem
explores the usefulness of using static features in determining scam membership and identifies
those static features explaining the most variation in scam case assignment.  This research problem
also provides recommendations for the required number of scam static features in determining
scam genre membership.
The first question of the Static Feature Selection Problem asked if static features could be used to
determine the scam membership of scam descriptions. It is concluded that scam static features are
an informative and useful data source for determining scam membership of scam perpetrations.
The most effective clustering model for achieving this, using scam static features as the clustering
variable, is the furthest neighbour Jaccard coefficient hierarchical clustering model.
The second question (a) of the Static Feature Selection Problem asked how many static features
were required to determine scam membership. Two final models were selected for comparison and
these were the 8 and 7-cluster furthest neighbour Jaccard coefficient models. The recommendation
for the most appropriate model is provided in the next section and without divulging too much
detail it can be concluded for the Static Feature Selection Problem that 68 of the initial 82 scam
static features are required for the successful assignment of scam cases to scam genres. The 68 scam
static features are all significant to the model at the alpha = 5% level. Some features were more
significant than others however, and this can be determined from the feature p-values and the
accompanying F-value. A small p-value (less than 0.05) implies that the static feature is significant to
the model and a large F-value infers greater contribution to cluster variation than a smaller F-value.
The third question (b) of the Static Feature Selection Problem required the identification of those
static features most useful in determining scam case scam membership. There were two static
features which were most important in identifying which cluster a scam case belonged to and these
were what the scam offered (see the below table), - employment (F = 243.588, p = 0.00), and the
role of the victim – customer (F = 123.176, p = 0.00). Following these two most significant static
features were the goal of the scammer – financial gain (F = 92.958, p =0.00), the role of the victim –
un-associated (F – 64.366, p = 0.00), goal of the scammer – information (F = 45.412, p = 0.00), and
the method of scam introduction – received (F =35.474, p = 0.00). Below in Table 24 is a summary of
the remaining significant static features.
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Table 24: Summary Table of Frequencies for F-Range and P-Values
The most significant static features for identifying the type of scam a scam belongs to are what the
scam offered, the role of the victim, the goal of the scammer, and the method of scam introduction.
What can be concluded here is that these static features are crucial to the successful scam
campaign. If a scammer were to be planning a new scam campaign, these are the priority features
that would need to be known and addressed by the scammer. Before launching a campaign, the
scammer must know what he/she seeks, they must have an end goal decided, knowing this, the
scammer develops a scam campaign which will deliver the desired outcome. From knowledge of the
desired outcome, the scammer must then decide on how he/she will introduce the scam to the
target, further to this, contingencies would be made on how to reach as many targets as necessary
to meet the intended goal.
The scammer must know how to get the target involved in the scam, to do this, the scam must offer
something to the target and finally, before the campaign can be finalised, the scammer must know
what role he/she plays in the campaign, and therefore, what role the target will play. By focusing on
these primary static features alone, rephrasing them into questions and finding answers to these
questions, useful and detailed information can be gained about the type of scam a scam might be
and this would assist investigators and researchers alike in their quest for answers.
5.1.4 Minimum Cluster and Least Membership Problem
The third research objective aimed to find the clustering model which best condensed scam cases
into the fewest number of clusters with the least number of scam cases within each cluster which
would be accurate at least 95% of the time. The Minimum Cluster and Least Membership Problem is
focused on determining which of the selected hierarchical models satisfy the minimum cluster, least
membership and accuracy of 95% and this was achieved through applying discriminant function
analysis on the results from the selected hierarchical models. Six hierarchical solutions were tested,
four from the furthest neighbour, Jaccard coefficient analyses and 2 from the within groups linkage,
Jacccard coefficient analyses.
The solutions for the number of scam clusters tested ranged from 6 to 9 and the results found
suggest that either hierarchical model, purposefully clustering scam cases by static features into 9
clusters will achieve 96% accuracy in scam prediction. This is a good result because it can be
immediately concluded that the number of scam genres that exist is 9 rather than the recorded 38
that were found during the data collection phase. However, the purpose of this research was to find
as few clusters with as few scams in each cluster as possible with a 95% level of accuracy.
The 8-cluster furthest neighbour Jaccard coefficient hierarchical cluster model was accurate in scam
case assignment 95.7% of the time. The first scam cluster detailed in Table 57 contains 21 scam
cases. The second scam cluster detailed in Table 58 contains 74 scam cases and the third scam
cluster detailed in Table 59 contains 51 scam cases. The fourth scam cluster detailed in Table 60
contains 22 scam cases and the fifth scam cluster in Table 61 contains 17 scam cases. The sixth scam
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cluster detailed in Table 62 contains 38 scam cases while the seventh scam cluster detailed in Table
63 contains 24 scam cases and the final scam cluster in Table 64 contains 30 scam cases.
Table 25: Scam Genre 1: 8 Cluster Model
2
The first scam genre in Table 25 above contains a mixture of scam types from scams that are
delivered in a face to face context such as door to door scams to those delivered over the Internet
like multiple bidding and Internet extortion scams. The scams clustered into scam genre one come
from a variety of sources and jurisdictions, Australian and the United States featuring equally. The
feature which stands out the most as a commonality among these scams is the once off or up front
payment to the scammer. It is suggested that the goal of the scammer for this group of scams could
be financial gain and this scam genre can be labelled Financial Gain Scams through Limited
Transaction Periods.
The second scam genre in Table 26 below contains a greater mixture of scam types than that seen in
scam genre one. There are a number of advance fee scams, Nigerian 419 scams and lottery scams. In
this scam genre appear charity scams and 900 telephone number scams as well. Scams sourced from
the United States appear more frequently than any other country in scam genre two, followed by
Australia then Canada and the UK equally and with this wide range of scam types it is difficult to
identify one or two distinct similarity properties which could be used to label this scam genre.
2 Scamwatch (SW, Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), Office of Fair Trading (OFT), Environics Research
Group (ERG), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), On guard online (OGO), Looks too good to be true
(L2G2BT), Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), United States Postal Inspectors Service
(USPIS), Scam smart (SS), and Queensland Police Service (QPOL)
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Scam genre three in Table 27 below also contains a range of scam types sourced equally from
Australia and the US and with a minor contribution from Canada and the UK. For those scams placed
into scam genre three, it is difficult to infer a title because there is such wide variety in scam type
present.
Table 26: Scam Genre 2: 8-Cluster Model
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Table 27: Scam Genre 3: 8-Cluster Model
The Effectiveness of using Static Features in Identifying Scam Genres
74
Table 28: Scam Genre 4: 8-Cluster Model
Scam genre four in Table 28 above is composed predominantly of employment-based scams from
working at home to money transfer and job opportunity scams. While only one scam from the UK
and two from Canada appear in scam genre four, Australia and the US are featured predominantly.
This scam genre can be titled Participation through Income Based Scenarios.
Scam genre five in Table 29 is made up of phone-based and advance fee scams. This scam genre
contains scam cases from Australia and the United Kingdom alone. The most common theme
emerging for this scam genre is the Financial Gain through Legitimate Appearing Scenarios. A
missed call and text message scam is successful because the victim is fooled into responding to the
missed communication and is charged excessively for their call back. These fees and charges do not
appear until the phone bill is received and may not even be recognised as an over-charge because
not all phone users check their bill statements. Another example of scammer financial gain through a
legitimate appearing scenario is the bogus model casting agency scam. In this scam the victim is a
client of a fraudulent modelling or talent agency. The victim may have been approached by a talent
scout for the agency or the victim may have submitted their portfolio for consideration to the phony
agency. In either situation, a scenario emerges which appears to be a legitimate situation requiring
the payment of fees.
Similarly to scam genre 5, for scam genre 6, found in Table 30, only scams sourced from Australia
and the United States are featured. A common theme emerging is the type of scam; either semantic
or syntactic, and the target of the scam which is information. For many of the scams in this scam
genre, the scam is syntactically driven and for nearly all of the scams, the goal of the scam is to
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gather information. This scam genre can be titled Information Gathering through Technology Based
Tactics.
Table 29: Scam Genre 5: 8-Cluster Model
Table 30: Scam Genre 6: 8-Cluster Model
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Table 31: Scam Genre 7: 8-Cluster Model
Table 32: Scam Genre 8: 8-Cluster Model
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Scam genre seven, in Table 31, above contains scams that are retail-based, predominantly in online
auction situations from online auction and shipping to non delivery and misrepresentation. Most of
the scams in this scam genre were sourced from the United States. Card skimming and ringtone
scams appear in this scam genre also and this could be attributed to the customer-seller based
relationship described in the original scam descriptions. This scam genre can be titled Financial Gain
through Retail Transactions.
The final scam genre for the furthest neighbour Jaccard coefficient 8-cluster model is scam genre 8
found in Table 32, below. While there appears to be a mixture of scam types within this genre, a
commonality emerges and this is the concept of investment. This scam genre contains pyramid,
Ponzi, get rich quick, and betting scams, including seminar and business opportunity scams., and
most of the scams found within this scam genre were sourced from Auastralia. Identity theft is also
prominent in this scam genre and for these reasons; this scam genre can be labelled Financial Gain
and Information Gathering through Investment Opportunity.
A seven-cluster solution provided by the furthest neighbour, Jaccard coefficient model achieved
94.7% accuracy, not quite reaching the required 95% level. By removing the non-significant static
features, those which did not contribute significantly to the placement of scam cases into clusters or
significantly account for variability among clusters were removed and the discriminant function
procedure re-run. It was concluded that discriminant function analysis is useful in determining
reliability of hierarchical models, it was also concluded that 68 scam static features were necessary
in determining scam memberships, not the entire sample of 82. Finally, it was concluded that the
fewest number of clusters with the least number of scam memberships, inferring homogeneity
across clusters and among cases was 7 and scam cases could be accurately allocated to a scam genre
(cluster) 95% of the time using the furthest neighbour, Jaccard coefficient hierarchical clustering
model.
The first scam genre contains 72 scam cases, these are listed in Table 33. This scam genre is made up
of scam cases that involve the most basic forms of trickery. These involve scams that are not
necessarily thorough in planning and detail. Victims falling for scam genre one scams would take
people and communications at face value and not expend time or energy on investigating scam
claims or the people behind them. These scams target the individual or company for once off
transactions initially and where possible, if there were potential for the scam to be extended to elicit
more funds from the victim, this would be pursued. Scam genre 1 contains scams that are at the
most basic level after the victim’s money. Door to door scams often involve the soliciting of services
that are paid for and never performed. Psychic and clairvoyant scams also involve the soliciting of
services or merchandise that is paid for and is not what it had promised to be. Cheque overpayment
scams involve the overpayment for a purchase and a request for the balance to be wired back. In
this situation, the cheque is fraudulent and the scammer walks away with the victim’s money.
Financial advice scams involve soliciting financial advice for a fee. Whether or not the advice is useful
is irrelevant since the victim has just paid a scammer and the scammer has walked away with their
money and possibly their personal and private details to use in a future scam. Similarity among
scams found in scam genre one emerge, the most significant is the payment of funds to the
scammer, for this reason, scam genre one has been titled Financial Gain through Low Level Trickery.
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Table 33: Scam Genre 1 – Financial Gain through Low Level Trickery
The second scam genre contains 74 scam cases and these are listed below in Table 34. This scam
genre is made up of scam cases that involve complex planning and detail. These scams hinge on the
opportunistic nature of the general public as well as the scammer. In this sense a common bond is
formed between the scammer and their victims and that is opportunity. The first scam in scam genre
2 is the charity scam. This scam relies on the poverty and necessity of others, it also comes about
when natural, or man made disaster strikes. These scams rely on assumed public knowledge of a
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cohort of individuals or a global tragedy. They are story based scams and offer to their victims the
opportunity to make a difference in the world through financial assistance. The ultimate goal of the
scams found in scam genre 2 is money, the same as scam genre 1 however, the method of realising
this goal is different. It would be worth investigating the dollar amounts lost to those scams found in
scam genre 2 and compare them to scam genre 1 because it is suspected that scam genre 2 scams
elicit greater amounts in funds while scam genre 1 elicits greater quantities of victims. It is
interesting to see unexpected prizes and chain letters grouped together with charity scams and
Nigerian 419 scams. This suggests some similarity in scam perpetrations; further investigation might
prove useful in determining on what grounds these scams are alike. It may be due to the story –
based nature of all of these scams. Another goal which manifests in dating and romance scams,
Nigerian 419 scams, and even spam offers is the collection of personal or private information. For
these reasons, scam genre two is titled Financial Gain and Information Gathering through
Developed Story Based Applications.
Table 34: Scam Genre 2 – Financial Gain and Information Gathering Through Developed Story Based
Applications
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The third scam genre contains 22 scam cases and these appear in Table 35. This scam genre is made
up of scam cases that involve complex planning and detail, similar to that found in scam genre 2.
This scam genre however, targets the individual in the sense that it seeks participation from its
victims. Each scam listed in scam genre three involves a level of victim ‘employment’ in which the
victim participates in a scam which is normally a laundering scam and for their participation they are
financially rewarded. These scams can often lead to identity theft since in becoming involved in one
of these scams; the victim may have been an applicant for what they had believed was an authentic
employment opportunity. With their application, the victim would have supplied the scammer/s
with a full working and educational history, full name and date of birth as well as bank account
details. For these reasons, scam genre three has been titled Participation and Information
Gathering through Employment Based Strategies.
Table 35: Scam Genre 3 – Participation and Information Gathering through Employment Based Strategies
The fourth scam genre contains 17 scam cases and these appear below in Table 36. This scam genre
is made up of scam cases that require victim call backs or responses to be successful. The scams
found here are different to those seen in scam genre one, two, and three. Most of these scams rely
on alternative technologies to that of the Internet and World Wide Web for dissemination. There are
a mixture of scams here that aim to trick the victim into responding and thus facing un-realised
charges. Regardless of the method of the scam, or the role of the victim, this scam genre contains
scams that aim to make money from the victim in ways that would seem necessary or pertinent to
the situation. For this reason, scam genre four is titled Financial Gain through Implied Necessary
Obligation.
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Table 36: Scam Genre 4 – Financial Gain through Implied Necessary Obligation
The fifth scam genre contains 38 scam cases and these appear below in Table 37. This scam genre is
made up of scam cases that involve high level knowledge of how systems operate. This scam genre
contains those scams that are syntactically driven such as spyware and key logger scams. This scam
genre also contains scams that seek information for the purpose of identity theft and credit/debit
card fraud. The reason why syntactic scams using spyware and key loggers are clustered along with
identity theft and credit/debit card scams is because syntactic attacks are dispersed with the goal of
gathering victim identity credentials or other forms of information. Therefore spyware and key
logging scams are a tool for the success of information gathering scams such as identity theft and
credit/debit card scams. Also found in scam genre 5 are phishing scams. These scams are also
synonymous with identity theft and credit/debit card fraud which was described in further detail in
the literature review section. For these reasons, scam genre five is titled Information Gathering
through Apparently Authentic Appeals.
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Table 37: Scam Genre 5 – Information Gathering through Apparently Authentic Appeals
The sixth scam genre contains 24 scam cases and these appear in Table 38. This scam genre is made
up of scam cases that involve and incorporate the roles of seller and buyer in the scam description.
These scams are all transaction based auction – retailer style scams. Internet auction scams were
described in detail in the literature review section of this research where five auction scams were
identified: shill bidding, bid shielding, merchandise non-delivery, payment non-delivery, and product
authenticity. All of these pre-identified Internet auction scams appear in their many guises below.
The goal of these scams is financial gain which is achieved through various versions and applications
of similarly styled scams. These scams are well researched and developed even though the victim
and scammer only communicate for a short period of time. For these reasons, scam genre six is
titled Financial Gain through Merchant and Customer Based Exploitation.
The Effectiveness of using Static Features in Identifying Scam Genres
83
Table 38: Scam Genre 6 – Financial Gain through Merchant and Customer Based Exploitation
The seventh and final scam genre contains 30 scam cases and these appear in Table 39. This scam
genre is made up of scam cases that involve the exploitation of investment opportunities. This scam
genre contains a mixture of scam types including Ponzi and pyramid, identity theft, computer
prediction software, investment seminars, charity fraud, affinity fraud, get rich quick scams and 419
advance fee fraud. Without further detailed analysis of the inter-connected nature of scam static
features to pin point the reason behind this, the presence of this mixture of scam titles is interpreted
as hinging on the suggestion of investment opportunities within each scam case. The scams within
scam genre 6 are marketed as money making opportunities, whether through investment, business
opportunity, shares or gambling. However, the goal of the scammer is financial gain and in some
instances this extends to information gathering. For these reasons, scam genre seven is titled
Financial Gain and Information Collection through Marketing Opportunities.
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Table 39: Scam Genre 7 – Financial Gain and Information Collection through Marketing Opportunities
While the 8-cluster model was slightly more accurate than the 7-cluster model, the 7-cluster model
achieved better partitioning of scam cases into groups called scam genres that could be confidently
titled based upon the types of scams receiving assignment to them. The 7-cluster model also
achieved the minimum accuracy requirement of 95% accuracy with all non-significant static features
removed. The second and third scam genres of the 8-cluster model could not be titled since it
contained such a wide mixture of scam types while all scam genres of the 7-cluster model could be
titled. The final model which satisfies the requirements of the Minimum Cluster and Least
Membership Problem is the 7-cluster furthest neighbour Jaccard coefficient hierarchical clustering
model. This model successfully partitions scam cases into the fewest scam genres with the least
number of scam cases per scam genre with 95% accuracy and requires 68 of the 82static features to
do so.
5.2 Summary
Two hundred and seventy seven individual scam cases and 82 purposely derived scam static features
belonging to 38 separate source classified scam genre categories were analysed using an
unsupervised agglomerative furthest neighbor, Jaccard coefficient hierarchical clustering model
which was verified and tested for reliability by a discriminant function analysis. This method
achieved 95% accuracy in partitioning scam cases into scam genres. The 38 source classified scam
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genres were reduced down to only 7 scam genres which were Financial Gain through Low Level
Trickery, Financial Gain and Information Gathering through Developed Story Based Applications,
Participation and Information Gathering through Employment Based Strategies, Financial Gain
through Implied Necessary Obligation, Information Gathering through Apparently Authentic
Appeals, Financial Gain through Merchant and Customer Auction Based Exploitation, and Financial
Gain and Information Collection through Marketing Opportunities. It was discovered that only 68 of
the 82 scam static features were required to achieve a 95% level of accuracy in scam membership
and the most prominent of these static features were what the scam offered, the role of the victim,
the goal of the scammer, and the method of scam introduction.
It is concluded that hierarchical clustering using the furthest neighbour and Jaccard coefficient is a
reliable method of clustering scam static features and that scam static feature derived from publicly
available scam descriptions are a useful source of information for scam investigation. It is also
concluded that scams are currently over classified within current literature and that only 7 scam
types or scam genres exist compared to the 38 recorded source-classified scam categories.
5.3 Future Work
Future work in this area would involve the collection of a larger sample of data including scam
descriptions from non-English speaking origins. From this the reliability of the scam static features,
hierarchical clustering model and the seven - cluster scam genre model revealed in this research
could be further verified. Building from the methodology applied within this research, a case study
analysis of scam perpetrations from initial contact and all communications to the final transaction
would be advantageous. Interrogation of scam lifecycles focusing on the flow of information could
pave the way for a strengthened approach in identifying scam processes rather than relying on just
static features. From such research more detailed inferences could be made about scammer
business process.
The next stage of research for this body of knowledge is the investigation of methods for automation
for the processing natural language. The collection and derivation of scam static features is a very
time consuming task. A concern raised is investigator bias in the identification of static features.
With the aim of accounting for such concerns and speeding up the process of content analysis of
scam descriptions, and later, written scamming accounts, a view to automation is expected. While
the process of automation is outside the scope of this research, it is thought that a system could be
developed which would allow for the input of a body of text – scam description or victim account,
and a content analysis would automatically run which would search the input text, comparing the
words used against a pre-identified list of target words, sentences and phrases (static features). The
automated process would then use the output information which would be a list of present/non-
present static features to aggregate the new scam case into its appropriate scam genre, based upon
its static feature composition.
The methodology applied here could also be useful if expanded to include all known types of
cybercrime and traditional crimes. The content analysis of crime descriptions, definitions, and victim
accounts leading to the identification of static features for each crime family would be useful in the
identification of business processes for each crime type. This approach could also benefit from the
addition of weighted features which would assist in the rigorous categorization of crime types by
adding a third dimension to the data – time, sequences such as order of events. Not only would this
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process assist in the understanding of crime-type architecture, but it would aid towards the
development of greater understanding of criminal business processes. The automation of such a
system may be useful in the identification of business models and attributing those found to known
organized crime groups.
Further to this, this research involves the identification of scam business processes and through the
use of common business methodologies such as risk analysis and critical path analysis, Scam Priority
Interference Metrics (SPIM) could be produced which could assist investigators in predicting possible
paths of active scam perpetrations and transactions based upon limited histories with applied
confidence and accuracy.
5.4 Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to form homogeneous groups of scam perpetrations through the
use of hierarchical clustering. It was identified that a hierarchy of fraud exists and through logical
deduction it was implied that a hierarchy of scams exists. Deriving data from publicly available scam
descriptions, hierarchical clustering analysis was used to ensure homogeneous partitioning of scams
into similar clusters which were inferred from the scam static features. The result of this procedure
was then tested for reliability by a discriminant function analysis. This research concluded with seven
analogous scam clusters which can now be used for future research. Further to the clustering of
scams by their descriptions is the opportunity presented to authorities to standardise scam
descriptions as well as assist in the identification of significant static features which can be used to
confidently identify the type of scam a scam is.
This research was composed of three research questions:
1. Which binary linkage method (furthest neighbour, between groups, within groups, and
nearest neighbour linkage) and binary distance measure (Jaccard or Simple Matching) best
partitions scam descriptions into homogeneous groups?
a. Which cluster result contains the fewest number of groups with the least number of
scam descriptions allocated to each group?
2. Can static features be used to determine scam group membership of scam cases?
b. How many static features are required to determine scam group membership?
c. What static features are useful in determining scam group membership?
3. Can a discriminant function analysis be used to predict scam group memberships for the
hierarchical cluster solutions with the fewest number of clusters and least number of scam
cases in each cluster to determine which solution accurately predicts scam group
memberships at least 95% of the time?
The furthest neighbour, Jaccard coefficient model of hierarchical cluster analysis provided the best
results for the homogeneous partitioning of scam cases. Both of the final results selected for scam
membership labelling were of this combination of linkage and distance measures and the final
cluster result containing the fewest number of groups and the least number of scam cases was the
7-cluster model.
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Static features can be used to confidently determine scam membership of scam cases and for the 7-
cluster model, only 68 of the 82 derived static features are required to accurately determine scam
group membership. The most significant static features useful in determining scam memberships
were the ‘what the scam offered’, ‘the role of the victim’, ‘the goal of the scammer’, and ‘the
method of scam introduction’.
Discriminant function analysis was suitable for predicting scam group memberships for the
hierarchical cluster solutions with the fewest number of clusters and least number of scam cases in
each cluster to determine which solution accurately predicts scam group memberships at least 95%
of the time with the final 7-cluster solution achieving 95% accuracy with all insignificant static
features removed.
The results of this research contribute to scam and fraud literature as well as extend on current
scam and fraud research methodologies by extending on the applications regularly used in focussed
scam research and applying them here in this research. Further to this, the reduction of scam events
into homogeneous scam clusters will assist investigative and enforcement agencies by reducing
time, money and resources spent on scam case investigations. It is also hoped that the results from
this research will lead the way towards a common scam lexicon and enhanced coordination and
cooperation in transnational taskforces.
This research is exploratory in nature and is therefore affected by some identified research
limitations. The methods selected for data analysis were chosen because they had been successfully
used in the past on either similar data types or in a related field to that being investigated here. One
of the biggest limitations to this research is the subjectiveness and interpretability of the data during
the data identification and data gathering phases. Since this research was manually sourced, coded
and collected, confidence can be gained in a single subjective and interpretive view which was stable
across the whole data identification and data collection phase. However, this manual process proved
time consuming and limiting because the researcher was limited to English only data sources and
bound by time. Given more time and assistance from non-English speaking individuals, a larger and
more representative, comprehensive sample could be attained. Due to the nature of the data
sources belonging to similar, related or same jurisdictions and countries, there is a possibility that
scam types were repeated across source platforms. Since scam descriptions are assumed to be
authored by the source agency, this has not become an issue in the consideration of data suitability
because the purpose of this study is to analyse and compare those scam types and genres across
related jurisdictions.
To the knowledge of this researcher, the combination of analyses used in this research on the type
of scam static features derived from those publicly available descriptions has not been attempted
before. Therefore, this study represents an exploratory study into the usefulness of scam static
features in predicting group membership and identifying scam genres. Exploratory analyses are
troubled by concerns with validity, reliability and reproducibility which are the reasons for testing
the reliability of the hierarchical clustering of scam static features using a discriminant function
analysis.
In conclusion, this body of research investigated the current state of research on scams. Presented
here is an overview of current scamming statistics as well as a comparison of the methodologies
used for each information source. Following this, various academic explorations into scam types was
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presented and the methodologies applied within such research explored. A gap in knowledge was
identified and research objectives and research questions presented to address this. The
implications of this research were discussed along with the proposed methodology and applied
methods for achieving the goal of the study. The research underwent numerous phases of
assessment and the analysis of the results revealed significant contributions to the research of
scams. A formal methodological process was defined by the success of these results, each research
question was successfully answered and this body of research effectively contributes to the field of
scams research.
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Glossary
Cyberscam A scam committed through the use of Internet technology
Cyberscammer One who commits a cyberscam
Fraud Acquisition of something of value through deceptive means
Fraudster One who commits fraud
Homogenous Relatively equal, similar, even
Scam A type of fraud, a tool used to acquire something of value through
deceptive means
Scammer One who commits a scam
Semantic Human focused
Static feature A single stable element of a larger group of elements
Syntactic Machine or technology focused
Technology based crime A crime that relies on the use of technology at some stage
throughout its lifecycle
Technology enabled crime A crime that requires the use of technology
Technology enhanced crime A crime that does not require but is enhanced by the use of
technology
Transnational Multinational
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Appendix
Table 40: Scam Static Features
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Figure 14: HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard Coefficient Cluster Membership Frequencies3
3 The x-axis is the number of clusters created, the y-axis is the cluster frequency
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Figure 15: HCA Between Groups Linkage Jaccard Coefficient Cluster Membership Frequencies
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Figure 16: HCA Within Groups Linkage Jaccard Coefficient Cluster Membership Frequencies
The Effectiveness of using Static Features in Identifying Scam Genres
104
The Effectiveness of using Static Features in Identifying Scam Genres
105
Figure 17: HCA Nearest Neighbour Jaccard Coefficient Cluster Membership Frequencies
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Figure 18: HCA Furthest Neighbour Simple Matching Coefficient Cluster Membership Frequencies
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Figure 19: HCA Between Groups Linkage Simple Matching Coefficient Cluster Membership Frequencies
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Figure 20: HCA Within Groups Linkage Simple Matching Coefficient Cluster Membership Frequencies
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Figure 21: HCA Nearest Neighbour Jaccard Coefficient Cluster Membership Frequencies
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Table 41: DFA 9 Cluster Results Tests of Equality of Group Means for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 42: DFA 9 Cluster Results Variable Failing Tolerance Testing for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
Table 43: DFA 9 Cluster Results Eigenvalues for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard Coefficient Model
Table 44: DFA 9 Cluster Results Function Significance Tests for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 45: DFA 9 Cluster Results Predicted Groups Memberships for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 46: DFA 8 Cluster Results Tests of Equality of Group Means for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 47: DFA 8 Cluster Results Variable Failing Tolerance Testing for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
Table 48: DFA 8 Cluster Results Eigenvalues for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard Coefficient Model
Table 49: DFA 8 Cluster Results Function Significance Tests for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 50: DFA 8 Cluster Results Predicted Groups Memberships for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 51: DFA 7 Cluster Results Tests of Equality of Group Means for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 52: DFA 7 Cluster Results Variable Failing Tolerance Testing for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
Table 53: DFA 7 Cluster Results Eigenvalues for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard Coefficient Model
Table 54: DFA 7 Cluster Results Function Significance Tests for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 55: DFA 7 Cluster Results Predicted Groups Memberships for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 56: DFA 6 Cluster Results Tests of Equality of Group Means for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 57: DFA 6 Cluster Results Variable Failing Tolerance Testing for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
Table 58: DFA 6 Cluster Results Eigenvalues for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard Coefficient Model
Table 59: DFA 6 Cluster Results Function Significance Tests for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 60: DFA 6 Cluster Results Predicted Groups Memberships for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 61: DFA 9 Cluster Results Tests of Equality of Group Means for the HCA Within Groups Linkage Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 62: DFA 9 Cluster Results Variable Failing Tolerance Testing for the HCA Within Groups Linkage Jaccard
Coefficient Model
Table 63: DFA 9 Cluster Results Eigenvalues for the HCA Within Groups Linkage Jaccard Coefficient Model
Table 64: DFA 9 Cluster Results Function Significance Tests for the HCA Within Groups Linkage Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 65: DFA 9 Cluster Results Predicted Groups Memberships for the HCA Within Groups Linkage Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 66: DFA 8 Cluster Results Tests of Equality of Group Means for the HCA Within Groups Linkage Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 67: DFA 8 Cluster Results Variable Failing Tolerance Testing for the HCA Within Groups Linkage Jaccard
Coefficient Model
Table 68: DFA 8 Cluster Results Eigenvalues for the HCA Within Groups Linkage Jaccard Coefficient Model
Table 69: DFA 8 Cluster Results Function Significance Tests for the HCA Within Groups Linkage Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 70: DFA 8 Cluster Results Predicted Groups Memberships for the HCA Within Groups Linkage Jaccard
Coefficient Model
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Table 71: DFA 7 Cluster Results Tests of Equality of Group Means for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model with Insignificant Features Removed
The Effectiveness of using Static Features in Identifying Scam Genres
163
Table 72: DFA 7 Cluster Results Eigenvalues for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard Coefficient Model with
Insignificant Features Removed
Table 73: DFA 7 Cluster Results Function Significance Tests for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model with Insignificant Features Removed
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Table 74: DFA 7 Cluster Results Predicted Groups Memberships for the HCA Furthest Neighbour Jaccard
Coefficient Model with Insignificant Features Removed
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Figure 22: Dendrogram Furthest Neighbour Jaccard Coefficient HCA Model4
4 Dendrograms can be seen in more detail at http://www.icsl.com.au/capability/identity-theft/scams
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Figure 23: Dendrogram Between Groups Linkage Jaccard Coefficient HCA Model
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Figure 24: Dendrogram Within Groups Linkage Jaccard Coefficient HCA Model
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Figure 25: Dendrogram Nearest Neighbour Jaccard Coefficient HCA Model
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Figure 26: Dendrogram Furthest Neighbour Simple Matching Coefficient HCA Model
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Figure 27: Dendrogram Between Groups Linkage Simple Matching Coefficient HCA Model
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Figure 28:   Dendrogram Within Groups Linkage Simple Matching Coefficient HCA Model
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Figure 29: Dendrogram Nearest Neighbour Simple Matching Coefficient HCA Model
